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 Violent Salafi jihadism, or VSJ, motivated the September 11 hijackers, but it is 
poorly understood by homeland security practitioners and not addressed in U.S. national 
strategies. This thesis argues that using precise language to define this threat is necessary 
to achieve a common understanding of the VSJ movement and posits that, based on the 
resources focused on this threat for the past 14 years, a unified national strategy is 
warranted.   
The use of the generic term “terrorism” has resulted in a vast array of 
counterterrorism “experts,” many of whom have little or no understanding of VSJ. An 
unintended consequence of conflating VSJ with motivation behind other Muslim groups 
using terrorist tactics is that it feeds the false narrative that VSJ represents Islam. 
Muslims in Asia and Africa are by far more often victimized by VSJ than is the “far 
enemy” in Europe and the United States.   
This thesis argues that imprecise language referencing the threat from VSJ has led 
to diluted and sometimes counterproductive, counterterrorism strategies. It also argues 
that the United States should disaggregate terrorist groups that do not directly threaten the 
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 The United States would benefit from a unified national strategy to combat 
violent Salafi jihadism (VSJ), the ideology that motivated the attacks on the United States 
on September 11, 2001. VSJ as a movement is based on an ultraconservative literal 
interpretation of the Quran that continues to survive the distributed and broad national 
strategies produced under the auspices of counterterrorism, homeland security, national 
security, and intelligence. This thesis argues that U.S. efforts to impact both the actual 
and perceived threat posed by VSJ have been hampered by the lack of a clear focus on, as 
well as understanding of, what motivates the VSJ adherents who constitute al-Qa’ida 
(AQ), Daesh,1 and other such groups that threaten U.S. interests at home and abroad.2  
There is no reference made to Salafi jihadism (violent is implied by referencing 
“jihadism”), a term coined by Gilles in 2002,3 by the national strategies reviewed here 
put forth by the White House, the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland 
Security, and the Department of State. This, despite the fact that the major incidents 
regularly cited in discussions about terror attacks on the U.S. and its interests routinely 
highlight the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York, 1998 U.S. Embassy 
bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole, and the 9/11 
attacks—all committed by VSJ adherents. There have also been less sophisticated or 
failed attacks inspired by VSJ, such as the Ft. Hood shootings, the Time Square plot, the 
plot to bomb the New York City subway system, and a myriad of others. In U.S. 
strategies, AQ has been put on par with adversaries far more capable and dangerous, both 
                                                 
1 Daesh is an Arabic word for the entity known in English as the self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS), 
also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).  
2 Due to the inconsistent references and spelling of both groups across government documents and 
literature, this thesis uses “AQ” when discussing al Qa’ida, and “Daesh” when discussing ISIL/ISIS. The 
use of the pejorative name “Daesh” emphasizes the point of this thesis, which is that allowing violent Salafi 
jihadism to represent Islam by referencing to adherents as the “Islamic State” provides them cache that is 
self-defeating for the U.S. and feeds their narrative, to be discussed later. 
3 Gilles Kepel, and Anthony F. Roberts Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, MA: I. B. 
Tauris, 2002), 220.  
 xiv 
inside and outside the U.S.4 Despite the lack of precision when discussing VSJ, when the 
U.S. refers to the “terrorist threat,” this is the movement being discussed. 
This thesis provides the reader an overview of Islam and Islamism as a foundation 
for understanding Salafism, if only to provide context as to what VSJ is and, perhaps 
more importantly, what it is not. Additionally, it explains the evolution and history of 
VSJ, as well as related factors of takfir and Wahhabism, and contrasts the threat posed by 
VSJ with definitions and language currently used in national strategies. A disaggregation 
of the various subgroups under Islam, even the relatively small percentage that commit 
terrorist acts, is key to moving towards workable and targeted solutions, as is 
understanding that Muslims are the primary victims of VSJ. Understanding the intricacies 
of the violent Salafi jihadi ideology and the diversity of its adherents, why the U.S. is in 
the crosshairs, and how VSJ relates to the global geo-political environment is necessary 
in order to turn the tide on what appears to be an intractable conflict. 
The doctrinal “bins” that inform how the U.S. combats and engages with VSJ are 
defined as counterterrorism, anti-terrorism, and countering violent extremism. These 
terms are used loosely across government at all levels in the U.S.; however, based on 
available documents, they do not provide a holistic framework for addressing the threat 
from VSJ. Currently, no single government agency is responsible for defining, 
understanding, and framing the VSJ threat for the U.S. In general terms, counterterrorism 
and anti-terrorism mean, respectively, offensively combating groups committing terrorist 
acts and defending against the damage terrorist tactics can inflict.5 This terminology does 
not discriminate among different groups that use terrorist tactics, simply defined as 
“politically motivated crime intended to modify the behavior of a target audience.”6 
Understanding the ideology and motivation is not part of the U.S. strategies reviewed for 
this thesis, which argues that differentiating between terrorist groups, in general, and 
                                                 
4 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: White 
House, 2015), i. 
5 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterterrorism (Joint Publication 3-26) (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2014), iii.  
6 Paul B. Davis, and Leonard B. Weinberg, Introduction to Political Terrorism (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1989), 6.  
 xv 
between those using the banner of Islam, specifically, is key to productive strategy. The 
U.S. government has multiple official definitions of terrorism, which does not support the 
development of a unifying strategic position to combat VSJ. 
Despite significant tactical successes against AQ and Daesh, U.S. 
counterterrorism strategies have had little measurable impact on VSJ adherents’ ability to 
recruit worldwide or on their interest in using violence to achieve their goals. According 
to Nadav Morag, “In fighting terrorism…the eradication of terrorist cells, the 
decapitation of the terrorist leadership, the blocking of terrorist funds, or the destruction 
of terrorist safe havens do not necessarily (and, in fact, rarely) result in the cessation of 
terrorist violence.”7 While the primary reliance on military and law enforcement tools 
may be one challenge to achieving strategic success, distributed national strategies that 
do not focus on VSJ pose a significant hurdle to defeating this poorly understood 
adversary. The U.S. needs to develop a common understanding, starting with precise 
language to reference the threat. This should set the stage for a unity of effort at the 
federal level, beginning with a national strategy, to strategically impact VSJ. 
The lack of reference to the term Salafi jihadi across multiple national strategies is 
primarily due to the lack of a common understanding of what the ideology is and the 
inability to clearly communicate who adheres to it (and who does not). There is a need 
for a whole of government approach to assess how to best minimize or eradicate this 
threat. Coining and using the term “violent Salafi jihadism” (VSJ) is a start; this 
emphasizes the violent nature of this movement to policymakers unfamiliar with Salafism 
in a broader context. Hard power strategies eliminating key adversaries and funding 
streams need to be bolstered by broader strategies that will affect the continued 
recruitment to and spread of this ideology.      
 
 
                                                 
7 Nadav Morag, “Measuring Success in Coping with Terrorism: The Israeli Case,” Studies in Conflict 
& Terrorism 28, no. 4 (2005): 307.  
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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
This thesis seeks to answer the question of whether the United States would 
benefit from a unified national strategy to combat violent Salafi jihadism (VSJ1), the 
ideology that motivated the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. VSJ as a 
movement continues to survive the distributed and broad national strategies produced 
under the auspices of counterterrorism, homeland security, national security, and 
intelligence. This thesis argues that U.S. efforts to impact both the actual and perceived 
threat posed by VSJ have been hampered by the lack of a clear focus on, as well as an 
understanding of, what motivates the VSJ adherents who constitute al-Qa’ida (AQ) and 
Daesh2 and threaten U.S. interests at home and abroad.3 This thesis posits that a focused, 
unified national strategy would be more effective than the current distributed strategies in 
four ways: 
• Establish a common understanding of VSJ and its focus on the U.S. 
• Set more precise language or common lexicon reflecting an improved 
understanding of that threat. 
• Ensure that the strategy is focused on this limited but significant threat 
specifically and effectively. 
• Provide commander’s intent demanding a “whole of government” effort 
focused on the VSJ threat that would in turn guide implementation of a 
national strategy across all agencies. 
There is no reference made to Salafi jihadism by the national strategies reviewed 
here, put forth by the White House, the Department of Defense, Department of Homeland 
Security, and the Department of State. This, despite the fact that the major incidents 
regularly cited in discussions about terror attacks on the U.S. and its interests routinely 
                                                 
1 The J in VSJ will be used to reference jihadism only; other variations (jihadi, jihadist) will be spelled 
out. 
2 The Arabic word used for the entity known in English as the self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS) 
also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).  
3 Due to the inconsistent references and spelling of both groups across government documents and 
literature, this thesis will utilize “AQ” when discussing al Qa’ida, and “Daesh” when discussing ISIL/ISIS. 
The use of the pejorative name “Daesh” emphasizes the point of this thesis, which is that allowing violent 
Salafi jihadism to represent Islam by referencing to adherents as the “Islamic State” provides them cache 
that is self-defeating for the U.S. and feeds their narrative, to be discussed later.  
 2 
highlight the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York, 1998 U.S. Embassy 
bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole, and the 9/11 
attacks, all committed by VSJ adherents. In addition, there have been less sophisticated or 
failed attacks, such as the Ft. Hood shootings, the Time Square plot, the plot to bomb the 
New York City subway system, and a myriad of others inspired by VSJ. In U.S. 
strategies, AQ has been called an “evil that is intent on threatening and destroying our 
basic freedoms and our way of life;”4 it is put on par with threats posed by Russian 
expansionism, climate change, pandemic disease, and those which impact U.S. cyber 
infrastructure.5 Despite the lack of precision when discussing VSJ, when the U.S. refers 
to the “terrorist threat,” this is the movement being discussed. 
Gilles Kepel, who coined the term “Salafi jihadism,” describes VSJ followers as 
puritans willing to use violence describing them as having “supercilious respect for the 
sacred texts in their most literal form…with an absolute commitment to jihad.”6 VSJ 
advocates the establishment of a “global caliphate” and accepts “takfir,” which they use 
to justify expulsion or murder of anyone who does not adhere to their extremist ideology. 
This thesis argues that, while the term “Salafi jihadism” is accepted and understood in 
academic and some journalistic circles, it has not gained traction in policy discourse at 
the national level. Adding the descriptor “violent” may aid in making this more 
acceptable despite the sensitivity of mentioning a religion in a negative context. This is 
addressed in more detail in Chapter III. 
This thesis provides the reader an overview of Islam and Islamism as a foundation 
for understanding Salafism, if only to provide context as to what violent Salafi jihadism 
is, and perhaps more importantly, what it is not. Additionally, it describes the evolution 
and history of VSJ, as well as related factors of takfir and Wahhabism, and contrasts the 
threat posed by VSJ with definitions and language currently used in national strategies. A 
disaggregation of the diverse subgroups under Islam, most of them non-violent, is key to 
                                                 
4 White House, National Strategy for Countering Terrorism (Washington, DC: White House, 2003), 1.  
5 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: White 
House, 2015), i. 
6 Gilles Kepel, and Anthony F. Roberts Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam (Cambridge, MA: I. B. 
Tauris, 2002), 220.  
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moving towards workable and targeted solutions, as is understanding who in the Muslim 
world suffers because of VSJ. Understanding the intricacies of the violent Salafi jihadi 
ideology and the diversity of its adherents, why the U.S. is in the crosshairs, and how VSJ 
relates to the global geo-political environment is necessary in order to turn the tide on 
what appears to be an intractable conflict. 
One of the impediments to combating the violent Salafi jihadi threat is the failure 
to define and understand what it is, and conversely, what it is not. The term 
“counterterrorism” appears prominently in various national strategies. Depending on the 
immediate context, “counterterrorism” can refer to a variety of groups, motivated by a 
variety of factors. Specificity is required; words matter. Both the Bush and the Obama 
administrations made efforts to be more specific with language, with limited success, for 
reasons addressed in later chapters. The evolution of these efforts has resulted in fallback 
language in all of the strategies referencing “al Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents,” or 
even less specific, “the terrorists,” but valuable clarity can be gained by calling it what it 
is: violent Salafi jihadism.  
Specific violent Salafi jihadi aligned groups may come and go; the undercurrent 
of these groups is the fringe, radical, violent Salafist movement targeting the U.S., which 
continues to appeal to new recruits. The success of recruitment efforts to attract new 
adherents to VSJ has been at the root of contentious political discussion. While the U.S. 
government can point to significant tactical successes against AQ over the past decade, 
the overall impact on VSJ and the capabilities of its adherents is another issue. To make 
the point, Daesh, which is currently terrorizing civilian populations in Syria and Iraq and 
recruiting new fighters from the West, adheres to VSJ; this threat is broader than AQ. In 
fact, the number of violent Salafi jihadi groups has increased over the past 25 years, from 
three in 1988 to an estimated 49 in 2013.7 A unified national strategy, under which 
various federal agencies can operate, should address the ideology and movement using 
precise language, as opposed to focusing on any one group. 
                                                 
7 Seth G. Jones, A Persistent Threat: The Evolution of Al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Jihadists (Santa 
Monica: RAND Corporation, 2014), http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR637, 27. 
 4 
It is standard practice in government circles to use certain shorthand language for 
complex issues; this enables compressed discussions among those “in the know.” This is 
true for many different areas of expertise but is very specific to government disciplines. 
Military, diplomacy, and law enforcement each has its own way of communicating that to 
the outside observer may not make sense. An example of this is the term “TOC” or 
“TCO” referring to transnational organized crime or transnational criminal organizations. 
Individuals working these issues in the government know exactly what type of activity is 
referenced just by the acronym. This is not the case relative to the threat posed by VSJ 
adherents that the U.S. has faced over the past decades. The lack of a common 
understanding of VSJ has left the U.S. without a lexicon to clearly define what it is and 
develop and implement a strategy to deal with it in a comprehensive way. Because there 
is no common understanding, and therefore no common language, the shorthand that has 
evolved over time has actually impeded developing a common understanding. Words like 
“counterterrorism” (CT), “anti-terrorism” (AT), and even just “terrorism” mean different 
things to different organizations at the federal level in the context of an agency’s mission 
and erode what should be that nuanced or “expert” understanding of this particular threat. 
The expectations of what expertise is needed in this area have been diffused along with 
the language. 
Since 2001, government agencies have made attempts to refine the language used 
to refer to the threat that manifested on September 11, 2001. The New York Times 
reported in 2005 that the problem was pervasive across the federal government: 
“Understanding the enemy starts with what to call it. The 9/11 commission talks of 
‘Islamist terrorists.’ The Central Intelligence Agency calls them ‘Islamic extremists.’ The 
United States Institute of Peace refers to ‘Islamist militants.’ And neoconservatives call 
them ‘Islamo-fascists.’”8 This underscores the need for a commonly understood lexicon 
that is specific to VSJ, without which there is the danger of sweeping more people into 
the “out group,” and potentially increasing the real or perceived strength of the adversary. 
Without a common lexicon, there is also a significant chance that policymakers will not 
                                                 
8 Bruce Stokes, “Next Steps on Terrorism? No Consensus,” National Journal 37, no. 37 (2005): 2764–
2765.  
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truly understand this threat, and national interests will be impacted by poor, weak, or 
counterproductive strategies.  
A lack of concentration, in addition to focus, has undermined U.S. national 
strategies related to counterterrorism. In an article discussing President Obama’s 
counterterrorism doctrine, Rohde references Bruce Hoffman’s comments as to its 
haphazard nature, noting,  
The United States focused its effort on Afghanistan in 2001, shifted to Iraq 
in 2003, returned to Afghanistan in 2009. Now, Obama announced a shift 
from Afghanistan to Syria. “It continues our pathology,” Hoffman said. 
“Our attention has shifted from one trouble spot to another with disastrous 
results.”9  
This pattern seems to have continued with the evolution of the civil war in Syria 
that has given birth to Daesh, and the current conflict in Yemen where the U.S. is 
supporting Saudi Arabia’s fight against the Shia Houthi in a geopolitical chess match 
against much feared Iranian influence. The U.S. government seems to have trouble 
establishing its own long-term strategy for that region of the world, and the resulting lack 
of clarity distracts from the movement that the U.S. is ostensibly focused on: VSJ. What 
is needed is something beyond counterterrorism (military/law enforcement offense) and 
beyond antiterrorism (military/law enforcement defense). What is needed is a rational, 
thoughtful, informed plan specific to the particular threat that, up to now, has cost the 
U.S. billions of taxpayer dollars in support of a “homeland security industrial complex”10 
and has had questionable impact on VSJ.  
Americans continue to suffer from fear and anxiety in relation to terrorism. A 
recent Gallup Poll showed that in March of 2015, 51 percent of Americans surveyed 
worried “a great deal” about terrorism. 11  This indicates that, in fact, VSJ is 
                                                 
9 David Rohde, “Obama’s Counterterrorism Doctrine: Let Locals Lead the Fight,” Reuters, June 4, 
2014, sec. World.  
10 Christopher Bellavita, “Changing Homeland Security: Ten Essential Homeland Security Books,” 
Homeland Security Affairs 3, no. 1 (2007): 5.  
11 Justin McCarthy, “In U.S., Worries about Terrorism, Race Relations up Sharply,” Gallup, March 
17, 2015. http://www.gallup.com/poll/182018/worries-terrorism-race-relations-sharply.aspx.  
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accomplishing at least part of the goal to terrorize America, the “far enemy.”12 The lack 
of a clear national strategy to counter this threat contributes to a general undercurrent of 
anxiety and insecurity, echoed in daily news reports, which amplify both. This particular 
movement has been able to project what some consider an “existential threat”13 to the 
most powerful country in the world, partly due to the failure of the U.S. to portray it in a 
proportional and realistic manner. This would be a key part of a unified national strategy: 
to reflect that while violent Salafi jihadis have clearly have expressed the intent, they lack 
the capability to bring down the United States of America. The threat they pose is 
measurable and manageable and may be susceptible to solid, targeted, holistic strategy, 
including a more resilient and even-handed response. This message needs to be clear. 
The fact that the national strategies reviewed for this thesis discuss 
counterterrorism either in broad terms, or with respect to a diverse set of specific 
organizations or groups, distract from the fact that VSJ poses a limited but significant 
terrorist threat to the U.S. and must be dealt with accordingly. Some of the strategies 
reviewed are vague, discussing counterterrorism in a broad manner that undermines the 
focus and effectiveness of the strategy. The lack of precise language opens the door for 
politicization of content, such as the inclusion of groups using terrorist tactics anywhere 
in the world, regardless of the direct or significant threat posed to the U.S. 
The doctrinal “bins” that inform how the U.S. refers to VSJ are counterterrorism, 
anti-terrorism, and countering violent extremism. These terms are used loosely across 
government at all levels in the U.S.; however, based on available documents, they do not 
provide a holistic framework for addressing the threat from VSJ. Currently, no single 
government agency is responsible for defining, understanding, and framing the VSJ 
threat for the U.S. In general terms, counterterrorism and anti-terrorism mean, 
respectively, offensively combating groups committing terrorist acts and defending 
against the damage terrorist tactics can inflict.14 This terminology does not discriminate 
                                                 
12 Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005).  
13 Jonathan Stevenson, “Pragmatic Counter-Terrorism,” Survival 43, no. 4 (2001): 42.   
14 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counterterrorism (Joint Publication 3-26) (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, 2014), iii.  
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among different groups that use terrorist tactics, simply defined as “politically motivated 
crime intended to modify the behavior of a target audience.”15  
The U.S. government has multiple official definitions of terrorism. The 
Department of Defense defines terrorism as “the calculated use of violence or threat of 
violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in 
the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.”16 For federal 
law enforcement purposes, terrorism is defined by law as an offense that:  
Is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by 
intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct; and is 
a violation of one of several listed statutes, including § 930(c) (relating to 
killing or attempted killing during an attack on a federal facility with a 
dangerous weapon); and § 1114 (relating to killing or attempted killing of 
officers and employees of the U.S.).17  
The purpose of that definition is to facilitate criminal charges and prosecution based on 
terrorist acts. The Intelligence Community defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically 
motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or 
clandestine agents.”18 This is a bit broader and used to guide intelligence operations and 
analysis against individuals and groups overseas.  
U.S. history is rich with references to terrorism from the very beginning, 
including massacres of Native Americans, actions of Ku Klux Klan, and attacks 
perpetrated by anarchists and other groups during the twentieth century,19 as well as 
more recent attacks, such as the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. This alone undermines 
the utility of using the term in discourse, which lends itself to conflating the threats from 
different groups and ideologies into one, amorphous “terrorist threat.” The use of the 
word “terrorism” without additional qualifying language not only makes it impossible to 
                                                 
15 Paul B. Davis, and Leonard B. Weinberg, Introduction to Political Terrorism (New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1989), 6. 
16 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Anti-Terrorism (Joint 
Publication 3–07.2), (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014), I-1. 
17 Criminal Penalties, 18 U.S.C., § 2332b.  
18 Management of Foreign Affairs, 22 U.S.C., § 2656f(d).  
19 Beverly Gage, “Terrorism and the American Experience: A State of the Field,” The Journal of 
American History 98, no. 1 (2011): 18–19, 73–94.  
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strategize against those perpetrating the attacks based on intent, capability, and 
motivation, but it also lumps all who employ such tactics into a singular, frightening 
“other” with nebulous goals and objectives. “Counterterrorism” and “anti-terrorism” 
continue to be the predominant terms used by the federal government (although there are 
some nuances across agencies) to refer to actions taken to address VSJ. The result is a 
primary focus on a “hard power” approach to dealing with a poorly defined, generic 
“terrorist” threat, which is vulnerable to broad interpretations as to who is a terrorist, 
promulgating conflation with other groups using similar tactics, unrelated to VSJ.  
While there has been some evolution in the federal government’s understanding 
of VSJ, it is not clearly reflected in national strategies. The U.S. currently has multiple 
national strategies that frame the issues as countering a tactic (counterterrorism), which is 
of questionable value. To make it more challenging, each strategy is drafted to view the 
issue through a specific lens and does not clearly feed into a common vision of how to 
specifically impact VSJ as a movement. For example, strategies developed by the 
Department of Defense seek to solve problems by bringing to bear the resources of the 
U.S. military. In the foreword of the National Military Strategy, the chair of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff notes that the strategy “describes how we will employ our military forces 
to protect and advance our national interests.”20 Similarly, strategies developed by the 
State Department view solutions as foreign policy and diplomacy. The message from the 
secretary is “As President Obama has made clear, ‘America’s security depends on 
diplomacy and development.’”21 An overarching strategy guiding a whole of government 
approach against the problem of VSJ would guide the use of all of the tools available: 
intelligence, defense, law enforcement, foreign policy, and economic power. 
Furthermore, common vision would guide multi-faceted efforts to undermine existing 
violent Salafi jihadi operations as well as future recruitment and support for VSJ goals.  
The responsibility for U.S. strategy that addresses VSJ is shared among several 
government agencies. This distribution of responsibility has impeded development of a 
                                                 
20 Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015 
(Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2015), i. 
21 U.S. Department of State, United States Department of State Strategic Plan, 2014–2017 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2014), 2.  
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common lexicon or shorthand used when describing that threat; consequently, an 
understanding of why the VSJ message resonates so strongly among new recruits 
continues to elude U.S. efforts to counter it. In lieu of one overarching strategy focused 
on combating VSJ, the U.S. currently has multiple strategies produced by federal 
agencies that address counterterrorism threats to the U.S. based on the perspective of that 
particular agency. Those reviewed for this thesis include the 2011 National Strategy for 
Counterterrorism,22 the 2015 National Military Strategy,23 the 2015 National Security 
Strategy,24 the Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan FY2012–2016, 25 the 
Department of State Strategic Plan FY 2014–2017,26 and the 2011 Empowering Local 
Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, 27  which constitutes the 
National Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) strategy. 28  Each of these strategies 
address a wide array of threats to the nation, but this thesis argues that they are too broad 
in scope to successfully guide a whole of government effort against VSJ and in fact do 
not mention Salafi jihadism at all. While the strategies are not at odds with each other and 
do undergo a coordination process which ensures the strategies do not actually contradict 
or conflict, there is no evidence of an interwoven strategy that ensures that together they 
address all issues related to a certain problem.  
This thesis uses a post-structural textual analysis methodology to determine the 
actual use language referencing (violent) Salafi jihadism in current national 
counterterrorism strategies. The purpose is to identify how the adversary is currently 
described, determine the impact to political discourse, and to establish whether or not it 
sufficiently supports a unified approach, or ideally, a national strategy targeting the VSJ 
                                                 
22 White House, National Strategy for Counterterrorism (Washington, DC: White House, 2011).  
23 Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States. 
24 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America.  
25 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan 
(Washington, DC: Department of Homeland Security Office of Policy, 2012).  
26 U.S. Department of State, United States Department of State Strategic Plan. 
27 White House, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States 
(Washington, DC: White House, 2011). For the purposes of this thesis, this document is referred to as the 
CVE National Strategy. 
28 Government Accountability Office, Countering Violent Extremism: Additional Actions could 
Strengthen Training Efforts (GAO-13-79) (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2012), 2.  
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movement. This researcher examined and quantified the language used in the strategies 
reviewed for this thesis referring to the terrorist threat. In addition to this, research to 
determine the need for precision of language provides support for the argument. This 
methodology “seeks to understand the ways in which these forms of representation take 
place, the assumptions behind them and the kinds of sense-making about the world that 
they reveal.”29 It concludes with an argument in support of a single national strategy to 
combat VSJ to protect and support U.S. national interests, targeting the movement itself 




                                                 
29 Alan McKee, Textual Analysis: A Beginner’s Guide (London: SAGE Publications, 2003), 17. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. TALKING ABOUT THE THREAT POSED BY VSJ 
Despite significant tactical successes against AQ and Daesh, U.S. 
counterterrorism strategies have had little measurable impact on VSJ adherents’ ability to 
recruit worldwide or on their interest in using violence to achieve their goals. According 
to Nadav Morag, “In fighting terrorism…the eradication of terrorist cells, the 
decapitation of the terrorist leadership, the blocking of terrorist funds, or the destruction 
of terrorist safe havens do not necessarily (and, in fact, rarely) result in the cessation of 
terrorist violence.”30 While the primary reliance on military and law enforcement tools 
may be one challenge to achieving success, distributed national strategies that do not 
focus on VSJ pose a significant hurdle to defeating this poorly understood adversary.  
The lack of reference to the term Salafi jihadi across multiple national strategies is 
primarily due to the lack of a common understanding of what the ideology is and the 
inability to communicate clearly who adheres to it (and who does not). There is a need 
for a whole of government approach to assess how to best minimize or eradicate this 
threat. Coining and using the term “violent Salafi jihadism” or VSJ is a start; this 
emphasizes the violent nature of this movement to policymakers unfamiliar with Salafism 
in a broader context. Hard power strategies eliminating key adversaries and funding 
streams need to be bolstered by broader strategies that will impact the continued 
recruitment to and spread of this ideology. 
There is an understandable reticence to use the name of a religious school of 
thought (Salafi) as part of this definition, as was cited by the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) in 2008. 31  DHS worked with American Muslims and produced a 
document that discussed the language used to describe the terrorist threat to the U.S. It 
                                                 
30 Nadav Morag, “Measuring Success in Coping with Terrorism: The Israeli Case,” Studies in Conflict 
& Terrorism 28, no. 4 (2005): 307.  
31 U.S. Department of Homeland Security [DHS], Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, 
Terminology to Define the Terrorists: Recommendations from American Muslims (Washington, DC: U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, 2008), 3. 
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cautioned against using terminology that might imply that the U.S. is in a war with 
Salafis, noting, “Salafism is a belief system that many people follow.” 32  While this 
statement has merit, the lack of precise language has, by omission, implied that all 
Muslims are a threat; this is a self-defeating approach.  
A review of the language used across six national strategies identified VSJ 
adversaries using a range of terms such as “al Qa’ida and its adherents,” “ISIL,” or just 
generic “terrorists.” At best, this approach targets an organization, not the violent cult-
like ideology33 that goes beyond any identified group. The “cult” reference is discussed 
more in Chapter III. The 2015 National Military Strategy coined a new term, violent 
extremist organizations (VEO); the term is undefined in that document, but it states that 
VEOs include AQ and ISIL. 34  There is no reference made to Salafi jihadis by the 
national strategies put forth by the White House, the Department of Defense, Department 
of Homeland Security, or the Department of State. This, despite the fact that the major 
incidents regularly cited in discussions about terror attacks, listed in the introduction, 
were all inspired by VSJ.  
By using generic language such as “the terrorists” to imply reference to the threat 
from VSJ, U.S. strategists take their eyes off the ball, leaving the door open to conflation 
of the threat from VSJ with non-violent Islamists or locally focused insurgencies that 
pose no threat to the U.S. The challenge of how to frame this effort began with the 
declaration of the global war on terrorism (GWOT). There was considerable controversy 
over the use of this terminology to feed strategy against what was then understood to be 
AQ. General Richard B. Myers, Bush’s Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted, “If you 
call it a war, then you think of people in uniform as being the solution.” He suggested, 
“The threat instead should be defined as violent extremists, with the recognition that 
terror is the method they use.”35 This supports the argument that the word “terrorism” is 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 3. 
33 For more on using “cult” to describe VSJ ideology, see DHS Office of Civil Rights and Civil 
Liberties, Terminology to Define the Terrorist.  
34 Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy, 1.  
35 Steve Zeitlin, “Talking Points,” Voices 34, no. 1 (spring 2008), 11.  
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not descriptive enough to guide a holistic strategy to counter VSJ and that conducting a 
traditional war against these adversaries may not be the solution in and of itself.  
The use of the GWOT as a frame for the post 9/11 threat environment related to 
VSJ has confused the issue and diluted U.S. strategy considerably in the years following 
the 9/11 attacks. This lack of clarity carries over to the use of “counterterrorism” as a 
field of expertise. The complexity of VSJ as it relates to both geopolitics and Islam is 
daunting; framing the counterstrategy around a tactic does not address VSJ. The objective 
of the VSJ movement is not to struggle against an oppressive government or to advocate 
for the rights of the disenfranchised, unless those will serve larger goals. Simplifying this 
issue as being about “terrorism” removes the context of this particular ideology by 
dismissing the motivation or rationale behind terrorist attacks motivated by VSJ. The 
U.S. Department of State has designated 59 groups as “terrorists,”36 all of whom became 
common adversaries of the U.S. and its allies in the GWOT. Despite the fact that the 
basis for the GWOT was the 9/11 attacks committed by the violent Salafi jihadist group 
AQ, this target list was broad enough to include insurgencies and locally focused groups 
like the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA), Shining Path in Peru, the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, the Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) in Spain, 
and the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in northern Iraq and Turkey. This broadened the 
growing field of counterterrorism to the point where it requires no knowledge of VSJ.  
U.S. strategies are designed to address VSJ by organization, specifically, AQ, or 
more recently, Daesh. Rineheart agrees, explaining, “America has chosen a clearly 
enemy-centric approach to combating AQ in order to achieve its objectives, which, as 
President Obama has recently stated, is to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat Al-Qaeda.”37 
Since the September 11 attacks, the U.S. has gone to extreme lengths to protect itself 
from violent Salafi jihadi violence. It has gone to war in two Muslim countries, expanded 
domestic intelligence collection beyond constitutional limits,38 and sent military and law 
                                                 
36 For the current list, see http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm.  
37 Jason Rineheart, “Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency,” Perspectives on Terrorism 4, no. 5 
(2010): 33.  
38 Charlie Savage, and Jonathan Weisman, “N.S.A Collection of Bulk Call Data is Ruled Illegal,” New 
York Times, May 7, 2015, sec. Politics.  
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enforcement personnel into dozens of countries to conduct counterterrorism missions. All 
of these programs and actions are or were ostensibly intended to counter VSJ, and yet this 
movement is never mentioned. Raufer discusses how framing this enemy as an 
organization is problematic, arguing:  
Using a word creates a representation in the human mind. When you 
present as a fact that there actually exists an Al Qaeda organization, you 
create a common perception of a mechanical structure, like a motor car or 
clock. You press a button, and you honk the horn. You touch another 
button, and the windscreen wiper works. This mechanical model is the 
West’s terrorism model: pyramidal, hierarchical. The ‘strategic leadership’ 
issues an order, then an attack occurs. Finally, the act is claimed on the 
organization’s letterhead.39  
This does not realistically portray the distributed and networked operations of VSJ 
inspired actions and recruitment, nor has this approach been strategically successful.  
The lack of a clear, coherent, and focused national strategy specific to the VSJ 
movement has also had a negative impact on the standing of the U.S. with the 1.6 billion 
Muslims worldwide,40 including the more than 2.6 million Muslims who live in the 
U.S. 41 When not referring to AQ or another organization as the adversary, political 
discourse commonly involves generic terms like “Islamic terrorism” (e.g., the 2007 
National Intelligence Estimate referred to “Islamic terrorist groups and cells, especially 
al-Qaeda” as the main terrorist threat to the United States42), as well as “militant Islam” 
or “radical Islam” by self-proclaimed experts43 that signify a weak understanding and 
communication of Islam generally and VSJ specifically. This lack of specificity in 
language combined with decades of representations in public discourse portraying Islam 
                                                 
39 Xavier Raufer, “Al Qaeda: A Different Diagnosis,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 26, no. 6 
(2003): 394  
40 Bill Chappell, “World’s Muslim Population Will Surpass Christians this Century, Pew Says,” 
National Public Radio, April 2, 2015, http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2015/04/02/397042004/muslim-population-will-surpass-christians-this-century-pew-says.  
41 Andrew Stern, “Numbers of Muslims, Mormons Rising Sharply: Report,” Reuters, May 1, 2012, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/01/us-usa-religion-census-idUSBRE8401NK20120501.  
42 National Intelligence Council, The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland (Washington, DC: 
National Intelligence Council, 2007), 5.  
43 Steven Emerson, “Terrorism in America: The Threat of Militant Islamic Fundamentalism,” in The 
Future of Terrorism, ed. Harvey W. Kushner, 33–54 (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1998). 33–54.  
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as inherently violent and Muslims as irrational undermines efforts to hone in on VSJ and 
disaggregate this movement from the Muslim population at large. 44  The resulting 
demonization of Islam by the media and some policymakers has not only contributed to 
the confusion, it undermines an effective, targeted strategy to combat this violent 
movement.  
VSJ is a subset of Salafism, one that relies on a violent, puritanical interpretation 
of Sunni Islam and believes fervently in the Wahhabi tenet of takfir, translating its 
original meaning of excommunication to what amounts to sanctioned murder. 45 
According to Pew Research, a vast majority of Muslims do not support VSJ or terrorist 
tactics,46 but according to Dina al Raffie, it is in the best interest of VSJ ideologues to 
emphasize the commonalities of a master narrative47 to overcome the wide divergence in 
beliefs. If all fundamentalist or radical Muslim groups are at risk of being dubbed 
“terrorist” by the U.S. government and determined to be an enemy of the state, despite 
the absence of any actual threat posed to U.S. and Western interests, the U.S. directly 
feeds into the VSJ narrative. Al Raffie describes this:  
The master narrative (of violent Salafism) has a strategic outlook in that it 
works to create both real and perceived hostilities between Muslims and 
non-Muslims…The primary purpose of the master narrative is to drive a 
wedge between Muslims and non-Muslims, through funneling messages 
and ideas through a religious filter.48  
This supports the argument that use of the general terms “Islamic extremism” or “Islamic 
terrorism” when referring to VSJ is counterproductive. 
It is difficult to lay all blame on policymakers for not having any depth of 
knowledge on the subject of VSJ. They cannot be experts on all topics, and they must 
                                                 
44 For more on negative Western perceptions of Islam, see Edward Said, Covering Islam: How the 
Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World (New York: Vintage Books, 1997). 
45 Quintan Wiktorowicz, “The New Global Threat: Transnational Salafis and Jihad,” Middle East 
Policy 8, no. 4 (2001): 27.  
46 “Muslim Publics Share Concerns about Extremist Groups,” Pew Research Center, September 10, 
2013, http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/09/10/muslim-publics-share-concerns-about-extremist-groups.  
47 Dina Al Raffie, “Whose Hearts and Minds? Narratives and Counter-Narratives of Salafi Jihadism,” 
Journal of Terrorism Research 3, no. 2 (2012): 13–31.  
48 Ibid., 19. 
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rely on others to inform their own understanding. Expertise that the U.S. government 
relied on in the years after 9/11 has not served policymakers well. Self-proclaimed 
experts on “terrorism” emerged to fill the knowledge vacuum domestically in the national 
security and public safety sector. Retired law enforcement officers and agents, foreign 
security consultants, and neo-Orientalist scholars have become the cadre of advisors that 
feed the discourse.  
According to Mueller and Stewart, the response to the 9/11 attacks was unlike 
anything seen following other crises.49 Referencing their article, “The Terrorism 
Delusion,”50 in which they describe what they consider to be an overreaction to the 
terrorist threat to the U.S., Crenshaw poses the question: “Why do governments not treat 
terrorism as the equivalent of any other disaster?”51 Doing so would serve to undermine 
the key aspect of terrorism, which is to terrorize; building resiliency should be part of a 
unified strategy to discourage future attacks. In their article, Mueller and Stewart suggest 
that, in fact, AQ got lucky on September 11, and U.S. reaction to this successful attack 
may have empowered it beyond what it ever could have been otherwise. Crenshaw goes 
on to explicate:  
On the supply side, Mueller points to the ‘terrorism industry’ in 
government, the media, and among ‘risk entrepreneurs.’ Certainly the 
number of ‘terrorism experts’ has multiplied since September 11. In order 
to underscore the value of their advice, they are surely tempted to present 
their views as radically new and the threat as qualitatively different from 
past dangers. It is also fair to say that as newcomers to the field they may 
also lack the historical background to put the threat in perspective.52  
Raufer added the implication that the U.S. was slower than European countries to 
develop any expertise related to VSJ; in an interview with PBS’s Frontline discussing the 
term “Salafi,” he stated: 
49 John Mueller, and Mark G. Stewart. “The Terrorism Delusion: America’s Overwrought Response to 
September 11,” International Security 37, no. 1 (2012): 81–110.  
50 Ibid. 
51 Martha Crenshaw, “A Welcome Antidote,” Terrorism and Political Violence 17 (spring–summer 
2005): 518.  
52 Ibid. 
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I used it and wrote it many times, and the first response they had was 
when Ahmed Ressam [who planned to attack Los Angeles International 
airport] was arrested in 1999. I had a friend in Washington who called me 
and said, what is that word you were using, Salafist? They didn’t know 
that such a thing existed.53  
That there is room for improvement in U.S. strategies was illustrated by Seth 
Jones, who made the case as recently as 2012 that “several indicators suggest that al 
Qaeda is growing stronger” by referencing the growth of its network and the allegiance 
sworn to bin Laden’s successor, Ayman Zawahiri, by several VSJ groups in Africa and 
Asia. 54 Jones’s assessment was written prior to the more recent evolution of Daesh, 
which began as al Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), and supports his assessment. The former AQI 
has been successful in not only recruiting foreigners to fight in Iraq and Syria, but in 
stoking global fears that it is training these foreign recruits to send them home to the 
West to commit violent acts in its name. An unnamed law enforcement official was 
recently quoted calling Daesh’s successes “not so much a recruitment effort as it is a 
global marketing campaign, beyond anything that al-Qaeda has ever done.”55  
What constitutes violent Salafi jihadism? Where did it come from, and why is the 
U.S. a target? What level of threat, or more significantly, risk, does it truly represent to 
the U.S. and its interests? Answering these questions is necessary to establishing a core 
understanding and developing an effective strategy against VSJ. Strategies have evolved 
from framing the problem as an effort to stop “terrorist attacks,” as was depicted in the 
2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism: 
The intent of our national strategy is to stop terrorist attacks against the 
United States, its citizens, its interests, and our friends and allies around 
the world and ultimately, to create an international environment 
inhospitable to terrorists and all those who support them.56 
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That strategy looked across terrorism worldwide as a problem to be addressed 
based on the premise that there was commonality and support across the landscape of 
groups committing terrorist attacks. While there may have been cooperation among 
terrorist groups in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., the Irish Republican Army was reportedly 
trained by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and there were efforts to 
collaborate with the Italian Red Brigades and the German Red Army Faction),57 the VSJ 
movement is different and needs to be approached differently. It bears no resemblance to 
nationalist movements like the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA), left wing narco-
terrorist groups like the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), or the 
apocalyptic Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, aside from the use of terrorist tactics; yet, 
those groups are all mentioned in that 2003 strategy document. 
The differences between VSJ and the motivations of the groups mentioned above 
are significant; the use of terrorist tactics is the only common thread. It is similar to 
framing all states with nuclear weapons as presenting a “nuclear threat” to the U.S. VSJ 
advocates violence in accordance with an interpretation of Salafism that adds its own idea 
of violent “jihad” to the level of the five pillars of Islam (to be discussed in a later 
chapter) and justifies the killing of apostates (fellow Muslims who do not believe as they 
do) and civilians as doing God’s work.58 This is very different from the nationalist or 
communist leanings of RIRA and FARC. VSJ is not a struggle for political representation 
in government or ethno-nationalism but, first and foremost, a violent, fundamental 
interpretation of Salafism seeking to dominate Sunni Islam. 59  Unlike the non-VSJ 
inspired terrorist groups mentioned in national strategies, VSJ adherents have made 
effective use of so-called “walk-ins” from dozens of countries, “sympathizers with little 
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to no paramilitary training who volunteer themselves for operations,”60 as was noted by 
McAllister’s reference of AQ. These individuals have become a valuable tool for the VSJ 
movement at large, particularly for Daesh. He goes on to note that the difference between 
nationalist and narco-terrorist groups and the VSJ movement is that the prime driver and 
motivation for VSJ is neither profit nor nationhood but ideology, which means the VSJ 
movement should be addressed differently. Citing Hoffman, McAllister asserts, 
“Although leadership interdiction is a valuable component in the war on terror it is not a 
viable method of counterterrorism.”61 Diaa Rashwan, a leading researcher on Islamic 
militants at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies in Cairo agrees, 
saying, “Al-Qaeda is now an idea, or even a political program, that has spread around the 
world…The leadership is isolated, and we don’t know if it can organize attacks, rather 
than inspire them.”62 This perspective argues for a more innovative approach to deal with 
VSJ than has been used in dealing with other groups using terrorism to achieve their 
political objectives. 
Many other groups that use terrorist tactics focus on achieving their goals in their 
respective countries; even their activities outside of their operational areas are in support 
of their goals in that context. Conversely, as Marret noted in his analysis of al-Qaeda in 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM also known by GSPC63), the threat posed by the VSJ movement 
can be viewed as a hybrid of global and local, or “glocal,” organizations.64 He asserts 
that, while they are primarily focused locally, some have been internationalized based on 
their relationships with ethnic diasporas, particularly in Europe, and common interests 
with other VSJ groups. The U.S. invasion of Iraq served to bring common cause to many 
locally established groups. To prove this point, Marret explains,  
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In June 2006, the U.S. military announced that approximately 20 percent 
of suicide bombers there are Algerian. Another 5 percent are Moroccan 
and Tunisian, and arrests in Algeria in the summer 2006 suggest that the 
GSPC may be helping to funnel some of these North Africans into Iraq.65  
In this instance, VSJ motivated collaboration among culturally and ethnically diverse 
groups, in common cause against the US, its allies, and Iraqi Shia. 
The attraction that AQ has to other VSJ inspired groups in various regions of 
Africa and Asia (AQ in Iraq, the Arabian Peninsula, and Maghreb, and Boko Haram in 
Nigeria) can be better understood in this “glocal” context. American discourse often 
refers to these as AQ “franchises,” referencing a network similar to corporate structures 
in the West, assuming there is a command center and common purpose. However, 
according to Strindberg and Wärn, these groups “are not products of the central core; 
they do not grow out of a unified body, but emerge from their own specific local contexts 
and needs.”66 While there is the stated desire among them to reinstate a VSJ caliphate, 
Nonneman notes, “the movement has failed to take notice of the fact that there simply is 
no universal Islamic culture.”67 This is an important factor for U.S. strategies to address 
and exploit.  
The lack of a clear focus on the VSJ movement supported by specific expertise 
needed to address it has blurred the lines between who is a threat, who is not, and why. 
This can partly be attributed to a large body of academic discourse written from a 
Western perspective, called Orientalism, which represents an earnest but unsophisticated 
early effort (late nineteenth century) by Western academics to understand Arabs and 
Muslims. Orientalism eventually spawned a more conservative and biased academic body 
of work related to the peoples and the cultures that adhere to Islam, called neo-
Orientalism. According to Strindberg and Wärn, neo-Orientalism as a school of thought 
emerged from “the Orientalist idea that Islam is a monolithic bloc stretching from 
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Morocco to Kuwait, and that its core concepts are fixed and immutable are key elements 
of the political discourse of what has been referred to as neo-Orientalism.”68 While 
Orientalism represents an immature but honest effort to understand the “Muslim world,” 
neo-Orientalists have displayed a chauvinism that has influenced U.S. understanding of 
VSJ, portraying it as representative of Islam.  
Instead of defining VSJ to the U.S. in the context of an ultra-conservative 
fundamentalist and violent interpretation of Sunni Islam, both Orientalist and the neo-
Orientalist scholars who informed policymakers after 9/11 have tended to depict Islam as 
the problem. Edward Said lamented that this perspective had outsized influence on U.S. 
strategies:  
As with terrorism studies scholars, a great many identifiable orientalist 
Middle East scholars, including Bernard Lewis, Noah Feldman and the 
late Raphael Patai, have made frequent appearances as advisers and expert 
witnesses for official bodies, thereby transmitting many of the central 
assumptions and narratives of orientalist scholarship into the policy 
process.69  
According to Alsam Syed, two of Lewis’s neo-conservative protégés, Daniel 
Pipes and Martin Kramer, propagate a monolithic perspective of the Muslim world in 
political discourse that are biased and impeachable as to academic value. Syed criticized 
the fact that the Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy (a think tank founded by 
Martin Indyk, former U.S. Ambassador to Israel and official for the American Israel 
Public Affairs Committee, or, AIPAC), solicited Pipes and Kramer:  
To ‘educate’ Americans on the ‘failure of Middle Eastern studies’ in the 
United States. It would be relevant to mention here that this institute had 
on its board and committee people like Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz, 
and it is not difficult to imagine what sort of scholarship this study was 
assigned to discover.70  
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The mention of Richard Perle and Paul Wolfowitz is significant in that they are 
well known ardent supporters of Israel. While serving in various U.S. government 
positions, both have been the subject of U.S. counterintelligence concerns that have 
included documented efforts to aid Israel by providing it with U.S. classified information 
and technology.71 Syed’s implication is that neo-conservative policymakers with close 
relationships with Israel are politicizing the study of the Middle East at the expense of 
Muslims and Arabs, and are not particularly concerned with the academic rigor of their 
positions. 
The influence of neo-Orientalism and the overall Western bias against Muslims 
has gone beyond national policy circles, undermining efforts to disaggregate the VSJ 
movement from Islam as a world religion. As recently as 2012, it was revealed that the 
New York Police Department had included a highly politicized film, reportedly received 
by an employee of the Department of Homeland Security, called The Third Jihad, 
warning of “radical Islam’s vision of America” in counterterrorism training provided to 
police officers.72 The film demonized Islam as an existential threat to the U.S. The film’s 
website advertises the film this way:  
The Third Jihad is the groundbreaking film that reveals the truth. It 
exposes the destructive aims of Radical Islam and its mounting threat for 
America and the world. It covers all the major players—the radical 
extremists and the leaders trying to stop them. The Third Jihad will update 
you on the most urgent issue of our time in ways you can’t find in the 
media.73 
The film’s narrator, a Muslim American physician who has testified before 
Congress on homegrown radicalization, says in the film, “Americans are being told that 
many of the mainstream Muslim groups are also moderate… When in fact if you look a 
little closer, you’ll see a very different reality. One of their primary tactics is 
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deception.”74 Amid an uproar from Muslim civic groups, the film was removed from the 
curriculum.  
In an angry response to the portrayals of Muslims in the backlash after 9/11, 
Mohammad Shahid Alam blames the lack of precision in language in the U.S. that has 
persisted for decades on neo-Orientalists, who use the terms “Islamists, Islamic 
fundamentalists, Islamic militants, Islamofascists, or Islamic terrorists…(meant to 
reference) all Islamicate movements—no matter what their positions on the political uses 
of violence,”75 framing the use of broad terms as a means of war against any Islamic 
resistance. In an article questioning whether the U.S. did, in fact, understand the “enemy” 
(referring to AQ), Byman cautioned, “…we must be careful not to create more enemies 
than necessary. In particular, policy must seek to avoid turning groups with primarily 
local aspirations into ones that share al-Qaeda’s global agenda.”76 
Academics, including Said, Strindberg, Wärn, and Jackson, have challenged 
Western misconceptions about political Islam, or Islamism, that erroneously characterize 
it as uniquely violent. Jackson analyzed more than 300 texts on the topic and concludes, 
“the discourse of ‘Islamic terrorism’ is profoundly unhelpful, not least because it is 
highly politicized, intellectually contestable, damaging to community relations and 
largely counter-productive in the struggle to control subaltern violence in the long run.”77  
U.S. policymakers’ conflation of the threat from violent Salafi jihadi groups with 
a perceived threat from all Muslims has contributed to government reaction that has 
inadvertently supported VSJ narratives. Jonathan Schachter addresses this topic in his 
dissertation, “The Eye of the Believer: Psychological Influences on Counter-Terrorism 
Policy-Making,” advising decision makers and analysts to ensure they better understand 
the contextual framework of the current conflict with Salafi jihadis to determine “the 
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most effective courses of action.” 78  Going back to the early 1990s, Richard Bulliet 
pointed out the same lack of nuance in understanding of the VSJ threat when he 
documented the reaction to the 1993 World Trade Center bombings observing,  
Preachers of hatred against Islam attempted to portray the Muslim faith as 
monolithic, unchanging, and viciously directed against Americans. What 
they did not choose to highlight was the enormous diversity among 
Muslim cultures or the focus within many Muslim groups on building 
community.79  
The U.S. relies heavily on Israel for advice on terrorism related matters. This is 
exemplified by a 2004 Senate report (108-420) that established a federal program 
between the U.S. and Israel to “identify, develop, or modify existing or near term 
homeland security information, equipment, capabilities, technologies, and services to 
further the homeland security of the United States and to address the homeland security 
needs of federal, state, and local governments.”80 Close relations with Israel and the 
desire for expertise in dealing with terrorism on a broader scale than America could 
manage alone has influenced the understanding of how broadly Muslims support or 
adhere to VSJ. In fact, Israeli organizations, such as the American Israel Education 
Foundation (AIEF) and the Anti-Defamation League (ADL) have funded 
“counterterrorism” training for U.S. members of Congress, law enforcement officers,81 
and other homeland security professionals for many years, thereby influencing how 
terrorism is perceived in the U.S. In 2011, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) received a complaint accusing AIEF of being a 
front for the Israeli backed lobbying group, the American Israel Public Affairs 
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Committee (AIPAC). 82  As a result of this and other such programs, the Israeli 
government has been the major influence on U.S. policymakers’ understanding of 
“counterterrorism,” despite a strong anti-Muslim bias based on its own security 
environment.  
While Israel has been dealing with groups using terrorist tactics for decades, and 
indeed, used such tactics in its struggle for independence from Great Britain in the last 
century, America’s challenge in countering VSJ is a very different animal. The struggle 
between Israel and its neighbors is as much if not more geopolitical in nature than it is 
ideological, but Israeli influence on U.S. discourse results in framing it as a problem of 
“Islamic terrorism.” This was in evidence after 9/11, when the American Israel Public 
Affairs Committee (AIPAC) focused on terrorism at its 2002 annual conference. 
Presentations emphasized the threat posed by Yasser Arafat, Osama bin Laden, Saddam 
Hussein, the Taliban, Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, and Syria. In a report documenting the 
2002 conference, Hearn wrote,  
Conference speakers thus looked near and far in their efforts to define 
those aligned with ‘terrorists’ against Israel …by drawing associations 
between Palestinian and Arab ‘threats’ and Bin Laden, they crafted a 
message of urgency tailored for the U.S. government and public: Stop 
suicide bombers and the states that support them, or they will target your 
streets and your children next.83 
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has consistently equated groups that 
threaten Israel with the VSJ movement embodied by AQ and Daesh that threaten the 
U.S., despite the clear divisions that exist in motivations, ideology, and objectives. In a 
speech to the United Nations, he argued, “HAMAS is like ISIS. HAMAS is like al 
Qaeda. HAMAS is like Hezbollah. HAMAS is like Boko Haram.” 84  While it is 
impossible to directly link cause and effect, U.S. strategies continue to cast a wide net 
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when addressing terror threats, as exemplified by the 2011 National Counterterrorism 
Strategy, which mentions both HAMAS and Hezbollah. 85  It is counterproductive to 
strategically address terrorism so broadly, and this has contributed to a generic approach 
to U.S. strategy and the use of imprecise language.  
The considerable gap between the politicized rhetoric surrounding “radical Islam” 
and a realistic assessment of actual threat to the U.S. from VSJ diminishes the U.S. 
government’s capacity to develop strategies to effectively counter that threat and assign 
resources accordingly. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official Paul Pillar observed:  
Overheated rhetoric that has spun out ever more frightening and unusual 
ways in which terrorists might inflict large numbers of casualties has also 
elevated the emotional content of discussions of terrorism and as such has 
not promoted balanced and temperate consideration of what to do about 
it.86  
Crenshaw references Israeli analyst Hanan Alon when noting, “In the case of 
terrorism, threat exaggeration also plays into the hands of the terrorists, as Alon pointed 
out in in 1980. A purpose of terrorism is to convey an inflated sense of the power of the 
terrorist.”87 The need to understand and assess the threat from VSJ in a rational objective 
manner is essential to managing resources, developing a plan, and measuring progress. 
U.S. political discourse tends to portray the threat as more pervasive than it is, 
framing the VSJ movement as a formidable opponent to the U.S. Audrey Kurth Cronin 
analyzes this, describing,  
Even as Al-Qaeda’s top leadership hunkered down in the Hindu Kush 
mountains and watched their subordinates being killed off through 
stepped-up drone attacks, new affiliates began naming themselves ‘Al-
Qaeda’ and expanding their reach, perpetuating the image of a seamless 
global threat…The western allies inadvertently reinforced it by 
swallowing the narrative of an endlessly adaptive, coherent movement 
with tentacles reaching throughout the world.88  
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Attributing such power and influence to VSJ perpetuates a fiction that it has a true 
foothold among the Muslim population, which in fact, is not the case. Muslim victims of 
violent Salafi jihadi violence in Africa and Asia far outnumber non-Muslim victims 
outside of that region.89 In her discussion about measuring the success of the GWOT, 
Rashmi Singh agreed, maintaining:  
The metrics (of the Global War on Terrorism) first constructed AQ as the 
key threat…to the very foundations of the post-Cold War world. Hence, 
AQ was framed as a vital challenge to ‘civilisation’ as a whole...This was 
truly astonishing given that AQ was a non-state organisation with a 
fraction of the United States’ material and ideological resources at its 
disposal.90  
Bin Laden confirmed this in a 2004 video, noting that it is:  
Easy for us to provoke and bait... All that we have to do is to send two 
mujahidin ... to raise a piece of cloth on which is written al-Qaeda in order 
to make the generals race there to cause America to suffer human, 
economic, and political losses.91  
Elevating AQ, an instrument of the larger VSJ movement, to the status of a well-
funded nation state is a result of talking around a non-specific, poorly defined adversary 
that is terrifying in its brutality and willingness to murder civilians. Fear has influenced 
much of the previous strategies; the time has come to formulate an effective, cohesive, 
and practical way forward against this adversary. 
Additional casualties of the imprecise language used to reference VSJ are Muslim 
Americans, and this may contribute to why the U.S. government uses the term “violent 
extremism” as opposed to something more precise, such as “VSJ.” However, despite the 
good intentions, it has only served to muddle the issue, and, in a vacuum of definition, it 
implies that all Muslims are suspect. Statements made concerning the proposed 
construction of an Islamic cultural center in the neighborhood of the 9/11 memorial in 
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Manhattan brought the fear and anger directed towards American Muslims into the public 
view. 92 The terror attacks achieved more than bin Laden could have ever hoped by 
inspiring such emotional responses against an entire religion, which would not be 
tolerated against any other minority group in the U.S. Bhatia expounds on this, saying:  
The declaration of a “war on terror” on an act rather than one specific 
group left the enterprise tantalisingly open to any number of 
interpretations or appropriations, with the terminology used by the Bush 
administration so polarising that contradictory information was discarded 
as irrelevant.93  
He goes on to compare the political discourse during the Bush administration to Balfour’s 
definition of propaganda, which seeks “to avoid or limit such [critical] discussion and 
secure instead the acceptance of certain interpretations without exposing them to it, to 
cajole rather than to convince,” 94  which Bhatia notes is particularly effective in an 
emotional environment, such as that created by terrorism. 
A consistent theme of this thesis is that VSJ presents challenges to the U.S. 
government that it has not yet managed to overcome. Understanding the movement itself 
is one thing; building and executing a strategy that will negatively impact the VSJ 
movement’s ability to grow and continue to threaten the U.S. and its interests is quite 
another. Moghadam asserts, “waging a battle against a religious ideology such as the 
Salafi-jihad is a challenging task that requires commitment and ingenuity.”95  
Commitment and ingenuity are not currently reflected in U.S. national strategies, 
most of which have been developed not to solve any particular problem, but to lay out the 
overall mission objectives of each agency. According to Glueck, in a management 
context, strategy is a “unified, comprehensive, and integrated plan…designed to ensure 
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that the basic objectives of the enterprise are achieved.” 96 The benefits of a unified 
national strategy with the clear objective to diminish or eliminate the threat from VSJ 
inspired groups, from which more agency-specific implementation plans can evolve, does 
not currently exist. VSJ has triggered one of the most expensive and resource intensive 
efforts ever executed by the United States government and therefore would seem to 
justify a focused, whole of government approach demanding a unity of effort such as that 
seen during World War II. 
B. U.S. NATIONAL STRATEGIES: A REVIEW 
A unified national strategy would provide a common foundation on which to 
strategize and emphasize the need for a holistic approach. The strategies reviewed in this 
thesis refer to the threat differently, and none focus clearly on VSJ. None of them 
mention Salafi jihadism; the language ranges from “AQ and adherents and affiliates”97 to 
“violent extremist organizations” 98  to the generic “terrorist” referencing activities, 
organizations, networks, and activities.99  
Each of the following plans was reviewed looking for specific language about the 
threat posed to the U.S. by the VSJ movement: 
• 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism 
• 2015 National Military Strategy 
• 2015 National Security Strategy 
• Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan FY2012–2016 
• Department of State Strategic Plan FY 2014–2017 
• 2011 Countering Violent Extremism Strategy (formally titled Empowering 
Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States) 
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These strategies outline a vision across major areas such as, “national security,” 
“homeland security,” “national intelligence,” “violent extremism” or “counterterrorism.” 
They address broad domains across the government, and discuss in general terms how the 
government will address problems in that mission space. While it does not necessarily 
make sense from an outside perspective, for example, to have a national security strategy 
separate from a homeland security strategy, it does make sense based on accountability; 
the agency with the lead on executing the mission has the responsibility for constructing 
the strategy. 100  The White House has overall responsibility for strategy over the 
executive branch agencies. Subordinate to the White House, Department of State is 
responsible for foreign policy; Department of Defense is responsible for military policy; 
and Department of Homeland Security is responsible for border policy (land, air, sea, 
cargo, and passengers) as well as a plethora of related missions including executive 
protection, cybersecurity, infrastructure protection, and immigration.  
This distributed approach to producing problem solving strategies has a weakness, 
known as Maslow’s hammer: if all one has is a hammer, then everything looks like a 
nail.101 Each agency, understandably, views a given issue through its own lens. Without 
an overarching definition of the problem (this is what it is, and this how we deal with it), 
it almost forces each of the mission based strategies to remain as general as possible 
within a given agency’s own mission space, so as not to conflict with the others, yet 
broad enough to address what may be a problem tomorrow. Porter and Mykleby put it 
this way: “…we have binned government departments, agencies, laws, authorities, and 
programs into lanes that lack the strategic flexibility and dynamism to effectively adapt to 
the global environment.” 102  This is a challenge based on how the U.S. government 
operates at a strategic level, and it merits additional study. 
The internationally acknowledged term “Salafi jihadism” is not mentioned in any 
of the documents reviewed, despite the implied or explicit emphasis in most on AQ or 
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Daesh, both motivated by VSJ. A unified national strategy would serve to not only frame 
the issue but to set out a common way to understand it. Clearly stated and in terms of 
practical efforts over the past 10 years, the U.S. national priority with regard to terrorist 
threats overseas and in the U.S. is VSJ. If resources are to be committed for 
“counterterrorism” efforts, they should be first and foremost committed to combat VSJ. If 
the VSJ threat is primarily from overseas, those resources need to address the current 
threat posed by individuals, logistics, and operations, in addition to factors that could 
influence future threats, including the spread of this ideology. The inconsistent use of 
generic terms implies that the adversary includes any violent extremist organization, 
operating anywhere, against anyone, for any reason. This is overbroad, unrealistic, and 
wrong. While it would be a high-minded goal to devote resources to combatting terrorist 
tactics wherever they are used, the U.S. has limited resources, and must be practical about 
what can, and should, be a priority. As was mentioned earlier in this thesis, it is doubtful 
that anyone takes the VEO reference to mean that the U.S. is actively targeting the RIRA, 
ETA, or violent hate groups on U.S. soil; most people understand the generic terminology 
as code for “Islamic extremist organizations,” which is not helpful in understanding VSJ. 
In arguing that more specific language is needed regarding U.S. national strategy 
and addressing the VSJ threat, it is necessary to clearly acknowledge efforts across the 
federal government since 9/11 to avoid defining this problem as Islamic. The response 
has been to define the problem as radical or extremist organizations, ensuring the 
language is generic enough not to offend. The weakness of defining the problem as an 
organization is exemplified by strategies prior to 2012 (such as the 2011 National 
Strategy for Counterterrorism)103 that do not refer to Daesh: Daesh was not foreseen in 
2011, and the next violent Salafi jihadi group to emerge may also be unpredictable. If 
VSJ as a violent ideological movement is the focus, then the specific organizations 
should become less central to the strategy (although fair game for tactical operations that 
support the overall strategy). The problem with generic language is that it assumes that 
there is a common understanding of the problem; research indicates that this is not the 
case. This holds true for each of the national strategies reviewed for this thesis. 
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1. National Strategy for Counterterrorism, 2011 
The National Strategy for Counterterrorism is solely focused on terrorism, but is 
at a disadvantage in that it is already four years old and the crisis in Syria that has given 
rise to Daesh had not yet materialized. Its approach to defining the threat is organization-
centric, focusing on “al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents.”104 Unless one considers 
Daesh an ally of AQ, as opposed to being a VSJ inspired group competing with AQ for 
notoriety and resources, this is insufficient to define the threat. This strategy uses the term 
“al-Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents” to represent the threat posed by VSJ adherents 
38 times. This AQ lexicon did not completely replace the more generic and unqualified 
uses of the terms “terrorism” (10 times), “terrorists” (34 times), “terrorist organizations” 
(10 times), and “terror attacks” (10 times) throughout the document. Furthermore, it 
never referenced the underlying VSJ ideology. As was discussed earlier in this thesis, use 
of the word “terrorism” and its variants without additional qualifiers is left to subjective 
interpretation. 
2. 2015 National Military Strategy  
The National Military Strategy (NMS) is broadly focused on the entire 
Department of Defense mission. Thus, while counterterrorism is a component, it is not 
the sole focus of the strategy. The predominant terminology referencing the VSJ threat in 
this strategy is “violent extremist organizations,” or VEOs, as “led by al Qaida and the 
self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).”105 Again, this speaks to an 
organization or enemy-centric approach, as opposed to focusing on the VSJ that 
motivates the individuals and the overall movement. In keeping with the hammer and nail 
analogy, Bhatia notes, “Enemification serves the purpose of determining a target for 
missiles to aim at...(and) engineers conditions within which people see it as necessary to 
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carry out military action.”106 The 2015 NMS references VEOs (with the implication that 
this means AQ and Daesh) 17 times; it refers generically to “terrorism” eight times. 
3. 2015 National Security Strategy 
Like the NMS, the National Security Strategy (NSS) is a broad strategy, but it 
does include terrorism in its scope. Published by the White House, it acknowledges the 
need to work against this threat in a more holistic manner but without referencing any 
specific movement or ideology. Instead, referencing “violent extremism” it states:  
We must recognize that a smart national security strategy does not rely 
solely on military power. Indeed, in the long-term, our efforts to work 
with other countries to counter the ideology and root causes of violent 
extremism will be more important than our capacity to remove terrorists 
from the battlefield.107  
This strategy uses the unqualified terminology of “terrorism” 29 times, and variants of 
“violent extremism” nine times. There is no mention of Salafi jihadism in the document.  
4. Department of Homeland Security Strategic Plan FY2012–2016 
The Department of Homeland Security unveiled its strategic plan just prior to the 
conflict in Syria so also did not have the advantage of seeing the emergence of the AQI 
follow on group, Daesh, being resurrected in Syria and Iraq. The DHS strategy is at a 
much higher level than the others reviewed here, covering most of its extremely broad 
mission space. Due to the very high level of this strategy, the language is probably the 
least precise of all those reviewed. However, it does set its first strategic goal as 
“Preventing Terrorist Attacks” with subordinate objectives:  
• Understanding the threat: Collect, gather, analyze, and appropriately 
share intelligence and other information on current and emerging threats.  
• Deter and disrupt operations: Deter, detect, and disrupt surveillance, 
rehearsals, and execution of operations by terrorists and other malicious 
actors.  
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• Protect against terrorist capabilities: Protect potential targets against the 
capabilities of terrorists, malicious actors, and their support networks to 
plan and conduct operations.  
• Stop the spread of violent extremism: Prevent and deter domestic violent 
extremism and the radicalization process that contributes to it. 
• Increase community participation in efforts to deter terrorists and other 
malicious actors and mitigate radicalization toward violence.108 
The strategy does not reference Salafi jihadism or anything related to a specific ideology, 
keeping with the generic use of the word “terrorism” and its variants (35 times) and 
“violent extremism” (twice).  
5. Department of State Strategic Plan FY 2014–2017 
Similar to the DHS strategic plan, the Department of State (DOS) plan is a few 
years old and covers the entire mission space of foreign policy. DOS is the agency that 
probably pays the most attention to precision of language due to its sensitive role in 
diplomacy. For this reason, it may be assumed that DOS would be the least likely to call 
out a religious ideology in its strategy. References to the word “terrorism” and its variants 
are only used 5 times in this document, with “violent extremism” and “violent extremist” 
used eight times. It states that part of the DOS strategy is to “counter violent extremism,” 
(presumably overseas) and that “the United States will focus on the drivers of violent 
extremism.”109 This document is more positive in tone than the other strategies, stressing 
U.S. actions to influence rather than control, possibly an acknowledgment of A National 
Strategic Narrative,110 written by Porter and Mykleby. However, it does not define or 
reference the threat as Salafi jihadism. 
6. 2011 Countering Violent Extremism Strategy 
The Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United 
States document, referred to as the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) strategy,111 
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differs from the other strategies in several aspects. One, it is focused on the influence of 
VSJ on U.S. citizens and residents, with the expressed purpose of preventing terrorist 
attacks in the U.S. While extremely important to public safety and homeland security, 
this problem is actually peripheral to the issue of addressing and defining VSJ in order to 
mitigate or defeat it. If the federal government designs an effective national strategy that 
impacts hardcore VSJ adherents where they live (predominantly in Asia and Africa, but 
also in Europe), the VSJ influence on vulnerable recruits in the U.S. should decrease. 
There is more research needed to determine if, in fact, the threat from VSJ would survive 
in the U.S. without that outside influence; the majority of Americans inspired by VSJ 
seem to be recruited or influenced by those who adhere to this violent ideology overseas. 
This was asserted in the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism, which states, “In 
the global information environment, al-Qa’ida adherents who promote or attempt to 
commit violence domestically are influenced by al-Qa’ida ideology and messaging that 
originates overseas.”112 This supports the need for a unified national strategy to combat 
VSJ where it exists as a movement, as success there will impact influence and 
recruitment in the U.S. 
The CVE strategy began as an effort to prevent VSJ from inspiring attacks in the 
U.S. CVE is a domestic program that has the mission of preventing “violent extremism,” 
detecting, deterring, and preventing attacks by “individuals who support or commit 
ideologically-motivated violence to further political goals.”113 Both the Department of 
Homeland Security and the Department of Justice (DOJ), in collaboration with state, 
local, and tribal government agencies, are responsible for implementing the national 
strategy114 with the goal of “improving our understanding of the means and mechanisms 
of violent extremism within the United States and its implications for our country.”115 
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The fact that there is no designated lead for this effort is problematic. The focus of the 
DHS CVE strategy is “homegrown violent extremists” or “HVE,” defined by DHS as:  
A person of any citizenship who has lived or operated primarily in the 
United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is 
preparing to engage in ideologically-motivated terrorist activities 
(including providing material support to terrorism) in furtherance of 
political or social objectives promoted by a terrorist organization, but who 
is acting independently of direction by a terrorist organization.116  
The focus of CVE is currently on federal government efforts to support local officials and 
community leaders “to prevent violent extremists and their supporters from inspiring, 
radicalizing, financing, or recruiting individuals or groups in the United States to commit 
acts of violence.”117  
The governing CVE strategy document Empowering Local Partners to Prevent 
Violent Extremism in the United States was published by the White House.118 Assigning 
two large agencies (DHS and the Department of Justice) “in collaboration with” the oft 
referenced “state, local, and tribal government agencies” as leads for this initiative 
presents challenges: if no one agency is accountable, it will be difficult to measure 
success or failure. The CVE national strategy implementation plan assigns both DHS and 
DOJ responsibility for supporting national CVE-related training efforts and emphasizes 
the importance of collaboration among federal, state, local, and tribal government 
agencies in order to achieve the goals of the strategy.119 In order for DHS and DOJ 
components to determine the extent to which they are fulfilling departmental CVE-
related responsibilities, they must be able to identify which of the trainings they conduct 
is CVE-related, which requires that they understand what constitutes CVE-related 
training.  
The CVE initiative addresses the issue of Americans or U.S. residents who 
planned, attempted, or perpetrated violent acts in the U.S. after having been inspired by 
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VSJ. Precision of language has been an issue in that, while understanding that this 
violence is inspired by a fringe group of violent Sunni Muslims, there have been concerns 
about how to discuss CVE without painting all Muslims with a broad brush. There is a 
push and pull between those who see the value in using more specific language to define 
the problem, and those who resist because the proposed language is not specific enough 
to be helpful. On the DHS CVE website, one must access documents linked to the site to 
see the more specific references to “al Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents;” 120 
however, the language used dilutes the focus of CVE efforts. For instance, the website 
reads:  
The threat posed by violent extremism…is neither constrained by 
international borders nor limited to any single ideology. Groups and 
individuals inspired by a range of religious, political, or other ideological 
beliefs have promoted and used violence against the Homeland.121  
While admirable in its purpose to prevent adoption of violent ideologies regardless of the 
origin, it is problematic to imbue one program with the responsibility for violent neo-
Nazi, white supremacist, left-wing and right-wing political and religious extremists as if 
they can be addressed the same way with the same tools.  
It is worth noting that House Resolution (H.R.) 2899122 proposed (as of July 15, 
2015) amending the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by adding an Office for Countering 
Violent Extremism in DHS, which would serve as the domestic counterpart to the DOS 
office dealing with CVE outside the U.S. Again, Salafi jihadism is not mentioned in the 
act but is only implied by references to “violent extremism.” 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW SUMMARY 
It is clear that the authors of these strategies have struggled with defining the 
terrorist threat facing the U.S. in the decades after the 9/11 attacks, with many of the 
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issues contributing to this struggle noted in this chapter. However, the use of imprecise 
language continues to fail those responsible for executing this important mission in a 
coordinated and focused way.  
In addition to the impediment of clearly referencing VSJ, there are overarching 
premises on which the U.S. could base a unified national strategy to turn back the tide on 
this movement. However, there is an immediate need to challenge common rhetoric and 
assumptions in order to have that conversation. For example, a good strategy would 
include an assessment of all government policies to ensure unintended consequences do 
not undermine a unified VSJ strategy. The U.S. has historically implemented a foreign 
policy, which in the context of combatting VSJ, has been counterproductive. 
Mearscheimer and Walt illustrated U.S. policy impact as a catalyst for VSJ inspired 
violence by noting Steve Coll’s account of Ramzi Yousef’s reasoning behind the first 
World Trade Center bombing in 1993. According to Coll, Yousef was driven by the 
desire to “stop the killing of Arabs by Israeli troops,” believing that attacking the U.S. 
was the “only way to cause change.”123 Yousef went on to say, “he truly believed his 
actions had been rational and logical in pursuit of a change in U.S. policy toward 
Israel.”124 According to Coll, Yousef “mentioned no other motivation during the flight 
and no other issue in U.S. foreign policy that concerned him.”125 U.S. foreign policy 
cannot be dictated by how it will impact the VSJ movement alone, but it would inform 
strategies to at least understand unintended consequences, particularly regarding the VSJ 
master narrative.  
There are significant cultural and political barriers to countering the violent Salafi 
jihadi movement, but understanding the reality of what VSJ is and how various groups 
subscribing to VSJ have survived despite U.S. efforts to eliminate them will provide a 
foundation to take U.S. strategy to another level. A common comprehension of what can 
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be done, such as disaggregating VSJ from other less significant threats and assigning 
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III. WORDS MATTER: EXAMINING “TERRORISM” AS THE 
FRAME TO UNDERSTAND THE VIOLENT SALAFI JIHADIST 
THREAT  
A. “TERRORISM” IS INSUFFICIENT TO DESCRIBE THE VSJ THREAT 
It is worth considering the unqualified use of the word “terrorism” as a standalone 
reference, at least in the development of national policy or strategy under the premise that 
words matter and that in order to advance our democracy, strategists must force more 
detail and consistency into the conversation. The tendency to view the threat from VSJ in 
the framework of a “war against terror” may make it easier for traditional military and 
political strategists to process, but it does not support a clear understanding of how to 
counter this threat. After the September 11 attacks, U.S. government officials tended to 
use the hermeneutic of previous wars to understand this new threat environment. In the 
9/11 Commission report, Condileeza Rice made just such a parallel:  
Despite the sinking of the Lusitania in 1915 and continued German 
harassment of American shipping, the United States did not enter the First 
World War until two years later. Despite Nazi Germany’s repeated 
violations of the Versailles Treaty and provocations throughout the mid-
1930s, the Western democracies did not take action until 1939. The U.S. 
government did not act against the growing threat from Imperial Japan 
until the threat became all too evident at Pearl Harbor. And, tragically, for 
all the language of war spoken before September 11th, this country simply 
was not on a war footing.126 
The fact that this statement was made three years after the attack by one of the 
president’s closest advisors is illustrative of the need to frame this new threat in a way 
that it can be understood—calling it a war made it easier to generate public support for 
the focus on military action as a “strategy.” This approach has been consistently taken by 
U.S. government officials and has contributed to the primary reliance on hard power. 
Friedman, Harper, and Preble assert, “The al Qaeda movement can still do serious 
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damage, but treating it as a new, monolithic threat like the Communist menace is 
profoundly counterproductive and makes it seem stronger and more united than it is.”127  
There are significant issues surrounding the use of the word “terrorism” as a 
standalone reference. One is that it is predominantly used in the U.S. to describe violent 
acts perpetrated by Muslims. Another is that the word itself does not differentiate 
between tactics used by citizens against an oppressive government and acts committed by 
narcotics traffickers used to cow a government and its population.  
Following the dramatic terrorist acts committed by Palestinian and other 
insurgency groups in the Middle East during the 1970s and 1980s, more attention was 
paid in government, academia, and media circles to Islamic groups struggling against 
their own governments or against those perceived as occupying Muslim lands. Yousef 
explains, “In the 1980s, active political Islam became synonymous with extremism and 
terrorism as seen by Western educators, decision makers, and media. It is also associated 
with hostage crises, suicidal explosions, and the killing of foreign tourists.”128 This led 
some over the past few decades to reflexively equate Islam with terrorism, and this 
calcified after 9/11. However, this is an extreme generalization, and it is not helpful when 
strategizing against a movement that has put the U.S. and other Western interests firmly 
in its crosshairs. It ignores the differences in goals, grievances, ideology, and adversary. 
This has resulted in an unproductive conflation of the threat posed by VSJ adherents with 
other groups that have resorted to terrorist tactics. According to Jackson:  
The application of labels such as “terrorist,” “fundamentalist” and 
“extremist” to groups like Hamas and Hizbollah for example, functions to 
obscure their simultaneous existence as political party, social welfare 
provider, protection force, local association, relief agency, charity, 
education provider, bank, guerrilla force and the like—as well as position 
them as the enemy of Western societies.129  
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The label “terrorist,” while technically accurate, also dismisses the objectives of 
both HAMAS and Hezbollah, which are rooted in power struggles related to geography 
that is now under the control of the Israeli government and the expansion of controversial 
Israeli settlements. Terrorist tactics employed by these groups, while brutal and deadly, 
are not driven by the same ideology that drives the VSJ movement, do not target the U.S. 
homeland, and therefore should not factor in to a strategy to combat violent Salafi 
jihadists.  
Terrorism as a tactic has traditionally been used by the weak against the strong, 
by individuals or groups against their real or perceived oppressors. The word itself is 
defined in law to suit the needs of a particular government, not all of them fair and 
benevolent protectors of the people whom they govern. By definition, what is just and 
allowable as far as tactics to influence behavior of those in power is judged by those in 
power. This rigs the playing field. Marsell and Moghaddam assert, “Efforts to alter 
political, economic, or social conditions by sub-national groups are not crimes in 
themselves, but the efforts must be conducted within the constraints of law and morality 
as codified in local, national, and international systems.” 130  However, this begs the 
question that, if governments create the laws that define what is terrorism and who is a 
terrorist and choose to maintain unfavorable conditions for a population, must the 
oppressed accept and surrender because that is the law? Former President Richard Nixon 
did not think so:  
There is an international disease which feeds on the notion that if you have 
a cause to defend, you can use any means to further your cause, since the 
end justifies the means. As an international community, we must oppose 
this notion, whether it be in Canada, in the United States, or anywhere 
else. No cause justifies violence as long as the system provides for change 
by peaceful means [emphasis added].131 
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The implication is that, as long as there are peaceful means to further a political cause, 
violence is not justified; however, if there is no political process by which to address 
grievances, it is not so simple. 
The understanding and portrayal of the VSJ threat in U.S. strategies has 
progressed over the years, evolving from the “global war on terror” (GWOT) to the threat 
posed by “al-Qa’ida, its adherents and affiliates.”132 However, if the U.S. is determined 
to diminish the threat posed by VSJ, it needs a unified strategy to focus on the movement 
more specifically. Reference to this threat under the umbrella of “counterterrorism” alone 
minimizes and dilutes what VSJ represents. Despite the fact that the threat is rarely 
framed as a GWOT in the current political discourse, Record’s assertion that we shift 
from a strictly counterterrorism focus is still relevant:  
Sound strategy mandates threat discrimination and reasonable 
harmonization of ends and means. The GWOT falls short on both counts. 
Indeed, it may be misleading to cast the GWOT as a war…to the extent 
that the GWOT is directed at the phenomenon of terrorism, as opposed to 
flesh-and-blood terrorist organizations, it sets itself up for strategic failure. 
Terrorism is a recourse of the politically desperate and militarily helpless, 
and, as such, it is hardly going to disappear.133 
This position represents the evolution from the U.S. targeting a tactic (terrorism)—
regardless of motivation or location—to the current approach, which is more 
organization-centric (AQ). The next step is to clearly define the movement that is not 
specific to one organization or group but is united in calls to attack the U.S. based on 
VSJ. 
In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, national strategies have struggled to address the 
threat posed to the U.S. by VSJ, with many competing agendas painting a different 
picture of the problem and how to deal with it. This has made an extremely complicated 
geo-political environment even more difficult to manage, understand, and impact. The 
GWOT was the initial context in which the federal government framed the threat, which 
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made everyone’s terrorists “our terrorists” in exchange for support for U.S. military 
actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Inclusion of disparate groups that employ terror tactics in 
U.S. political discourse and strategies when discussing the “terrorist” threat undermines a 
clear understanding and focus on VSJ in favor of a broader “counterterrorism” approach. 
This is particularly counterproductive for those who have public safety and security 
missions that do not require an in-depth understanding of geopolitics, intra-
denominational differences, and history of Islam in Europe, Asia, and Africa; they 
depend on national strategies to make clear whom the U.S. is targeting and why. 
Conflating the threat from all Islamic groups that have used or threatened to use 
terrorist tactics with VSJ inspired groups has diverted attention and focus on U.S. 
adversaries, and also implies that VSJ has more adherents in Muslim dominated countries 
than is the case. It is well documented that many groups labeled “terrorist” abhor VSJ 
beliefs and actions, and consider them at odds with their own struggles, including many 
Salafis themselves. Bleich supports this, citing Frank Buijs’ observations that Salafis 
described as purist and politicos134 “may actually serve as a barrier to terrorist actions 
rather than as the commonly supposed stepping-stone.”135  
Both the Muslim Brotherhood and HAMAS have condemned VSJ groups such as 
AQ and Daesh. Lebanese Hezbollah, one of the groups called out in the White House 
national CT strategy in 2011, is at odds with the VSJ influenced groups, as are many 
Lebanese Sunnis, the majority of whom are opposed to VSJ ideology. 136  In fact, 
Lebanese Hezbollah is actively involved in fighting VSJ in Syria both in support of 
Syrian President Assad’s government and in an effort to keep VSJ from gaining a 
foothold in Lebanon.137 Ayoob goes further, stating:  
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Both Hamas and Hizbullah are organizations that fall well within the logic 
of the state system and do not have universal visions of a global jihad. In 
this sense, Hizbullah and Hamas are more similar to the Irish Republican 
Army or the Basque separatist group ETA than to the al-Qaeda network or 
Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia.138 
There is an argument to be made that the focus on HAMAS and Hezbollah in 
current national strategies is a harmful distraction from VSJ. Hezbollah attacked the U.S. 
embassy in 1982 in an effort to oust foreign soldiers from Lebanon, not due to intrinsic 
hatred of the West or an adherence to violent Salafi jihadi ideology, and continues to 
focus on Israel in its local struggle for geography and power in the region. Saab and 
Ranstorp agree, saying,  
Lumping Al Qaeda and Hizb’allah in the same basket will only do a 
disservice to the global counterterrorism campaign. Each entity poses a 
distinct set of challenges to the United States and the West. Underscoring 
their differences serves the global war on terrorism better than creating a 
sense of solidarity between them.139  
Similarly, HAMAS is part of an insurgency that is the result of a conflict based on 
geography and civil rights, which has gone on for decades, and directly pits it against the 
Israeli government, not the U.S. Mearsheimer and Walt state, “In contrast to al Qaeda, in 
fact, the terrorist organizations that threaten Israel (such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and 
Hezbollah) do not attack the United States and do not pose a mortal threat to America’s 
core security interests.”140 This supports the development of a more focused assessment 
on which to base a unified strategy to mitigate threats to the United States and its national 
security interests. 
Defining the threat from VSJ is more useful than talking about an “organizational 
structure” of particular groups, which is common in the West. In trying to describe the 
threat, Tom Farer struggles, wondering, on one side is the U.S., arguably the most 
powerful nation on earth, and on the other side, what? He muses: 
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Not a state. Not even an organization, if one thinks in terms of some entity 
with the vertical lines of authority and responsibility. Rather, in Al Qaeda 
we seem to have a shifting cluster of self starting grouplets, in loose 
association, answerable finally to themselves, drawing inspiration, 
perhaps, from the iconic personality of Osama bin Laden, bonded by a 
particular interpretation of the Islamic faith, by a narrative of redeemable 
humiliation, and by a perceived enemy.141  
Even this perspective falters in that it is focused on an individual; the VSJ threat goes 
beyond Osama bin Laden, beyond Ayman al Zawahiri, and beyond Daesh’s Abu Bakr al 
Baghdadi. The U.S. needs to adjust its sights in order to truly see and understand the 
adversary beyond the context of military order of battle or transnational organized crime. 
B. THE U.S. NEEDS PRECISE LANGUAGE TO DEFINE THE THREAT 
Since 2001, many terms have been used to define the VSJ threat to the U.S. in 
strategy documents. Some of them were incorrect by definition, some exhibit an honest 
effort, but none have actually called them Salafi jihadis. In 2006, there was considerable 
concern regarding a term borrowed from the French government to refer to the to the 
terror threat to the U.S.: “Islamofascism,”142 which was adopted by neo-conservatives in 
the U.S. for a time. In 2008, the DHS Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) 
drafted a document based on engagement with and input from American Muslims called, 
Terminology to Define the Terrorists: Recommendations from American Muslims. 143 
DHS supported the argument put forth by this thesis, asserting that the U.S. should not 
use language that gives VSJ adherents like bin Laden the appearance of being more 
powerful and influential than they are; specifically using words that conflate VSJ with 
organizations like Hezbollah and HAMAS. DHS CRCL advocates referring to Salafi 
jihadists as a “death cult”: “Cults, while often linked to mainstream religions, have a 
negative connotation.”144 Had this been incorporated into the discourse early on, it would 
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have served the purpose of decoupling the acts of 9/11 from Islam as a world religion and 
also would have reduced the perception of the threat as “existential,” as it was initially 
portrayed. A cult is less threatening than the concept of a world religion on the warpath 
with America, which is how the threat from VSJ can be interpreted based on the general 
language currently in use. This DHS document made a solid effort to balance both the 
need of the government to define the specific threat and the intent to not offend or 
wrongly labeling all Muslims as terrorists by framing terrorism as “Islamic.” 
Unfortunately, Terminology to Define the Terrorists does not appear to have influenced 
the political discourse. 
It is interesting to consider, what if the cult reference had that been used 
beginning on September 12, 2001 to frame the threat posed by VSJ? U.S. strategies may 
have evolved very differently. This reference to VSJ as a cult at first seems dismissive, 
but there are accounts that discuss brainwashing of recruits, similar to what is done by 
cults. In this, model recruits have an understanding of the Quran is completely dependent 
on interpretations to which they are exposed (recitation is common with adherents),145 so 
the recruiters espousing VSJ may find fertile ground in someone seeking religion and 
structure in their lives. To these individuals, the Salafi reference may not be quite as 
significant, as some VSJ adherents may not truly understand the tenets of Salafism. It is 
possible that some recruits, particularly in the West, are indoctrinated more by 
propaganda-type media about the abuse of Muslims at the hands of the West than with an 
actual understanding of Sharia or takfir. As evidence of this theory, AQ published an 
instruction book to guide recruitment of new adherents; in many ways, it reads more like 
the handbook of religious cult than an educational treatise on Salafist theology: 
(B)e careful of talking about the problems of the Muslims from the 
beginning (of the relationship) so as not to make the relationship appear as 
your recruiting him; he will say to himself, “you are doing all of this with 
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me, just to recruit me, etc.” Also, don’t rush anything because there will 
be a proper time for everything.146  
It is interesting to note, this recruitment guide references this movement as Salafi jihad 
and acknowledges, “it is a fact that most of the salafis have ideas against Al Qaida and 
the mujahideen. They have taken these ideas from their scholars.”147 This supports using 
the terminology VSJ.  
The suggestion that the VSJ movement is a cult would benefit from further 
research, although if this could be proven, it would reflect harshly on the road the U.S. 
and the West has taken. The DHS CRCL report Terminology to Define the Terrorists 
acknowledges that while “the threat posed by terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda is 
far greater than that posed by most cult groups… ‘cult’ comparisons may advance 
strategic USG objectives by marginalizing those who falsely claim to represent ordinary 
Muslims.”148  
This DHS CRCL report also cautions against use of the term “Salafi jihadis” as 
having the potential to impact all Salafis negatively.149 The problem with using the term 
“Salafi” is that the majority of Salafis, discussed in the next chapter, do not condone or 
advocate violence against civilians. DHS also discourages the use of the term “jihadi” on 
its own, arguing that it glorifies violence against civilians as a sanctioned part of the holy 
war they claim to be waging. 150 This point has been made time and time again by 
academia, government officials, and the media, but it still seems to be a part of the post-
9/11 lexicon we cannot eliminate. The term violent Salafi jihadi fills the current gap in 
lexicon and addresses the lack of precision in language that has impacted a true 
comprehension of the threat, and the inability to accurately reflect it in national strategy. 
The point that the majority of Salafis do not believe in VSJ needs to be made 
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emphatically. It is not the Salafism that encourages the violence; it is the takfir ideology 
that condones the execution of those not like them, adopted from the Wahhabis of Saudi 
Arabia, that makes the VSJ movement different.  
The Department of Defense relies heavily on doctrine and common definitions, 
and as a result, appears to have the lead in setting government doctrine because it can, not 
necessarily because it should. This is a consequence of fighting VSJ as part of a “war.” 
Friedman, Preble, and Harper argue that the phrase “war on terror” incorrectly implies 
that the military should be the leading instrument of U.S. efforts and that this struggle, 
like a declared war between nation-states, has a definite beginning and end. The war 
frame can also cause strategists to “conflate the disparate threats posed by terrorist 
organizations,” the authors argue and this “plays into the terrorists’ own rhetoric that the 
West is engaged in a war against Islam.”151 
“Counterterrorism” was redefined in a 2014 Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication 
3-26 to mean: “Activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their 
organizations and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instill 
fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals.”152 It is significant in 
that, while not a strategy per se, it comes closer than any of the reviewed documents 
when referencing VSJ, stopping just short of calling out the ideology and framing it as a 
“transnational network”: 
Linked by radicalized interpretations of Islam, the most well-known 
network is al-Qa’ida, responsible for the attacks on September 11, 2001. 
Al-Qa’ida ideologues envision a complete break from all foreign 
influences in Muslim countries, and the creation of a new worldwide 
Islamic caliphate. Characteristic techniques employed by al-Qa’ida 
include suicide attacks and simultaneous bombings of different targets. To 
this day, al-Qa’ida and its affiliates remain a cohesive organization and 
threat to global stability..153 
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The references to a cohesive organization reference is arguable, not only with reference 
to AQ and its so-called franchises, but relative to VSJ overall. Notably, this publication 
identified a change from the previous 2009 version in that it:  
Narrows the definition of counterterrorism (CT) to actions and activities to 
neutralize terrorists, their organizations, and networks; removes 
countering root causes and desired regional end states from the 
definition.154  
This further narrows the Department of Defense approach to VSJ without quite defining 
what it is. This small change is significant in that it re-defines counterterrorism as hard 
power to be exercised against those (broadly defined) who commit terrorist acts. This 
presents many difficulties in that CT efforts are, as a result, somewhat standardized, 
regardless of the motivations, actual strength, or capability of the target to conduct a 
large-scale attack in the U.S.  
As mentioned earlier, government personnel communicate with a common 
lexicon based on their mission and area of expertise. The current common lexicon belies 
a common understanding of very limited but specific threat that VSJ poses to the United 
States. The lack of common lexicon, such as “violent Salafi jihadism,” or “VSJ,” 
weakens the ability to of national strategies to focus on that specific threat. Instead, the 
various code words used among government agencies include “violent radical 
extremists,” “Islamic radicals,” or simply just “terrorism.” These terms are 
counterproductive and not specific enough to be helpful. 
At least one reference to VSJ was found in an official document, but this 
terminology did not catch on, failing to “brand” the movement as that which the U.S. 
should target, specifically. Salafi jihadism was referenced in the Report of The Future of 
Terrorism Task Force, published in 2007, provided to then Secretary for Homeland 
Security, Michael Chertoff, by the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC). The 
introduction of this document asserts:  
The most significant terrorist threat to the homeland today stems from a 
global movement, underpinned by a jihadist/Salafist ideology. The 
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members of this movement seek to overturn regimes considered to be 
apostate; to re-establish the Caliphate; and to impose an extremist, militant 
interpretation of Islam.155  
Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) strategy differs from the other 
counterterrorism strategies reviewed in that CVE efforts are focused on “homegrown 
violent extremists.” While there is no mention of VSJ or Salafi jihadism, these federally 
supported efforts rely on local officials and community leaders to identify at risk 
individuals and are primarily focused on Muslim communities in the U.S. Would this 
effort be more effective if it was called “countering violent Salafi jihadi extremism?” It 
makes for an awkward and overly long acronym (CVSJE), but it does speak to the true 
concern. It is unclear how a strategy can make an impact if it is not precise in language 
and objectives, based on a common understanding. As it stands now, one might ask 
whether the CVE strategy targets violent white supremacist ideologues, such as the 
individual who murdered innocent civilians in a church in Charleston, South Carolina; if 
CVE strategy is primarily concerned with the use of terrorist tactics in the U.S, the focus 
beyond VSJ would be appropriate. However, there is no evidence that this is the case. 
There is a need to come to terms with what VSJ is in a way that does not offend all 
Muslims and makes clear that it is understood to be a small percentage of violent 
individuals (relative to the Muslim population). Allowing CVE to be subject to 
interpretation and potentially understood as a euphemism for “Islamic terrorists” is 
counterproductive. 
A major concern about accepting VSJ to define the predominant foreign terrorist 
threat to the U.S. is how will the majority of Salafis, who are non-violent, react to the 
specificity of this terminology? Will they appreciate the distinction provided by the 
words “violent” and “jihadi”? These are questions for additional research and are not 
addressed here. This thesis makes the argument that the focus on the generic (but implied 
by omission as Islamic) references to “violent extremism” and radicalization is a worse 
choice. Freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and the freedom 
to be radical and extreme are core American values. It is the violence here that is key; the 
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targeting civilians with violence in a coercive effort to force submission to an ideology is 
where the line must be drawn. Governments are free to have an open discussion with 
radicalized individuals and groups to provide another voice; this is a good thing. Forcing 
non-violent radicalized individuals underground for fear of being labeled “terrorists” 
limits them to small circles of influence where a violent narrative can be reinforced more 
easily than if open and honest dialogue, using very precise language, is encouraged and 
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IV. ESTABLISH A FOUNDATIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF 
ISLAM 
A. ISLAM, POORLY UNDERSTOOD IN THE WEST 
In order to better understand VSJ and how it evolved, it is helpful to have a basic 
understanding of Islam. VSJ adherents claim to speak for Islam, but in fact they are 
competing for primacy among Muslims. According to Moghadam, while they 
“selectively pick from the Islamic tradition only those elements that advance their narrow 
agenda, they nevertheless draw from the same religious sources that inform the lives and 
practices of more than a billion other Muslims.”156 In order to build a unified strategy 
targeting VSJ, it is important to understand the broader context of Islam. 
It has been difficult for U.S. officials to become knowledgeable on VSJ because 
the movement does not exist in a vacuum. One needs to come at the issue with at least a 
general comprehension of their narrative relative to Islam in general. In the foreword of 
Ademec’s The Historical Dictionary of Islam, this is addressed up front: “All religions 
are hard to explain, but few seem to be as difficult as Islam…(it is) swayed by different 
currents whose adherents hold different views.”157 He goes on to say that the meaning of 
the writing, predominantly in Arabic, is “hard to convey to outsiders and not always 
entirely grasped by Muslims.”158 This statement could be made about adherents of any 
major religion, but as this thesis shows, it manifests in particular ways in Islam.  
Islam is the second largest religion in the world,159 and while Muslims believe in 
one God, they are quite diverse regarding interpretation. Much like other world religions, 
“Islam represents a basic unity of belief within a rich cultural diversity.”160 All Muslims 
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believe in “God, the Quran, Muhammad and the Five Pillars of Islam,”161 but they are 
divided over the day-to-day questions of everyday life such as political participation, 
theology, interpretations of Islamic law, and how to deal with modernity.162 
Islam is a monotheistic world religion that evolved from Judaism and Christianity, 
a concept that is not well understood in the West. Halverson, Goodall, and Corman 
explain, “Muslims believe that the Qu’ran are God’s words as spoken through the Angel 
Gabriel to Muhammad, who was the ‘last in a series of prophets that also includes Noah, 
Abraham, Moses, and Jesus.’”163 References to Jewish and Christian holy books are 
found in Islam; a belief in descent of the faith from Abraham is common to all three 
religions. Much like Hebrew is the language of Jewish services, Latin the language of 
Roman Catholicism, and Greek the language of Orthodox Christianity, Arabic is the 
language of Islam. This, “despite the fact that 80% of the world’s Muslims are “not Arabs 
and typically do not understand Arabic.”164 Muslims believe that Islam is the corrective 
version of both Judaism and Christianity, both of which had strayed from the original 
word of God due to human revisions to the original texts, such as reference to Jesus as the 
Son of God.165  
Based on these commonalities, it is curious that most Westerners generally 
perceive Islam as a completely foreign religion. Joseph Rahme, in discussing the 
ethnocentrism of the term “Judeo-Christian,” explains, “Islam considers itself the 
culmination, and is a continuation of the Judaic- Christian heritage. This is simply 
illustrated by the fact that Muslims accept both Moses and Jesus, among others, as the 
bearers of revelations from God.”166 He goes on to describe the term “Judeo-Christian” 
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as signifying a particularly Western perspective that minimizes the common foundation 
among the three religions.  
The core beliefs of Muslims are anchored by the five pillars of Islam: the 
declaration of faith (there is no God but God, and Muhammad is the messenger of God); 
prayer; purification, or zakat, which is a tithe that provides a social safety net for the 
poor; fasting, which is done during the month of Ramadan; and the pilgrimage, or Hajj, to 
Mecca at least once in a lifetime if possible.167 Mecca is the birthplace of Muhammad, 
and considered the most sacred place in the world by Muslims.168 
The term ummah, which originated as a reference to the Medina community of 
Muslims and Jews, is used now as a term for the Islamic community,169 wherever it may 
reside, regardless of tribe, nationality, or ethnicity. The existence of the ummah 
reinforces the social identity aspect of Islam, despite differences in interpretations of 
Islam or participation on nationalist endeavors. 170  As with many social identity 
constructs, it is also used to define “the other,” or non-Muslims; it encourages unity of 
the in-group, particularly against external threats. In Sura 9:71, the Quran says: “The 
believers, men and women, are protectors of one another. They enjoin what is just and 
forbid what is evil.”171  
Generally speaking, Americans do not have any foundation for understanding 
Islam, or the nuances across the varied subsets of Islam, which is why it is important to 
understand and discourage the use of meaningless terminology like “Islamist extremist” 
in counterterrorism lexicon. As is explained later in this thesis, VSJ appeals to a relatively 
small number of Muslims who arguably violate the sanctity of the ummah by declaring 
apostate and killing Muslims who do not believe as they do. 
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B. ISLAMISM, OR POLITICAL ISLAM 
Islamism bears defining in the context of Islam in general, as the word “Islamist” 
is sometimes used as shorthand for “terrorist,” which is used in U.S. strategies to refer to 
VSJ adherents. Islamism, or, political Islam, is not specific to a particular sect or school 
of thought. Ayoob defines Islamism as “a form of instrumentalization of Islam by 
individuals, groups and organizations that pursue political objectives.” 172 Like Islam 
itself, Islamism is quite diverse. Fuller explains that Islamism “cannot be properly viewed 
as an alternative to other ideologies…because it cannot be placed anywhere on an 
ideological spectrum…but (is) a religious-cultural-political framework on issues that 
most concern politically engaged Muslims.” 173  The willingness to participate in a 
political framework is a commonality across Islamism, but many differences within can 
be explained using the quote made famous by former U.S. Speaker of the House, Thomas 
P. O’Neill: “all politics is local.”174 There are both local and global influences that 
impact the flavor of “Islamism” in a region or community. Much like Christianity has 
functioned in the West as a foundation for a social identity regardless of piety, Islamists 
use religion as the common ground by which to interpret and understand Muslim values 
in society. The language used by Islamists to generate support is grounded in the religion 
itself and used to justify the fight of ordinary Muslims against oppressive rulers.175  
While the words and references common to Islam writ large support the 
popularity and accessibility of political Islam, the devil is in the details. When one starts 
to scratch the surface, the differences in interpretation and beliefs within Islam emerge to 
expose the fullness and diversity of the religion as well as significant differences between 
Islamist groups. This has been a significant challenge for U.S. political discourse, 
exemplified during the so-called Arab Spring. It was difficult to differentiate between 
who posed a threat, and who was advocating for representation in government; the 
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language used, such as “Islamist,” “radical” and “extremist,” muddied the waters.176 The 
commonalities across the different schools of thought and approaches to maintaining the 
cultural and religious identity is important to understand, but these cannot solely guide 
Western comprehension. An understanding of the way Islamists use the appeal of general 
Islamic principles can be a useful tool, but there are significant differences in political 
goals and actual power struggles among Islamist movements. The main point here is that 
the category “Islamists” includes those who believe in political participation as a way to 
fulfill their religious vision, as opposed to violence. This opens the door to opportunities 
that may contribute to a national strategy to not only combat VSJ, but also marginalize 
the violent radicals relative to the greater Salafi community.  
C. SUNNI AND SHIA 
It is helpful to understand the differences between Sunni and Shia as a foundation 
for an understanding of VSJ.177 The split between Sunni and Shia dates back to the year 
632 CE. The Prophet Muhammad had died without naming a successor, and two camps 
evolved: one backed Muhammad’s friend and father-in-law, Abu Bakr to be caliph 
(Sunnis); the other (Shia), believing that the Prophet’s successor should be a family 
member, supported Muhammad’s cousin Ali. The majority Sunnis won out, and the next 
three caliphs were chosen by them. Ali did eventually become caliph; but when his son, 
Hussein, was killed in battle in 680 by the ruling Sunni caliph in what is now Iraq, the 
separation was solidified and resulted in a divergence in the practice of Islam.178 The 
division between Sunni and Shia has resulted in very different historical perspectives. 
The Sunnis enjoyed a long period of power and success, a “golden age in which they 
were a great world power and civilization”179 as the ruling majority under the Umayyad 
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(661–750 CE)180 and the Abbasid dynasties (750–1258 CE). 181 Conversely, the Shia 
were the underdogs, struggling “unsuccessfully during the same time period against 
Sunni rule.”182  
This division has manifested itself in modern times in the context of internal (e.g., 
Pakistan, Afghanistan) and external (e.g., Iraq and Iran) struggles between Sunni and 
Shia beginning in the 1980s.183 Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shiite Iran are also adversaries, 
and like the U.S. and Soviet Union in the Cold War, they support client states and 
movements in the Muslim world in a struggle for power, influence, and security in the 
region. This was seen clearly during the collapse of civil institutions in Iraq after the U.S. 
invasion (2003), as sectarian strife between Sunni and Shia filled the vacuum left by the 
removal of the fiercely secular Baathist (nominally Sunni) government by U.S. forces.184 
This rivalry has continued as the U.S. has withdrawn from Iraq.185 Another example of 
this competition was seen in Bahrain in 2011. As financial center of the region, it has 
significance for both Saudi Arabia and Iran and is courted by both for influence and 
support.186 More recently, while fighting in Yemen has sometimes been portrayed as 
terrorists fighting the government, there are indications that it has more to do with the 
conflict between Shia and Sunni, represented by Iran and Saudi Arabia.187 
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A hermeneutic that may be valuable is the frame of Christian denominations of 
Protestantism and Catholicism. In an article published in the Worcester Telegram and 
Gazette in 2006, Albert Southwick describes the parallels in layman’s terms. 188  He 
explains that Catholicism bears similarities to Shia, and Protestantism resembles Sunni. 
The differences are based in similar foundational structures. For Christians, the 
foundation is how they view Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit, and with Muslims, it is 
based on who they perceive to be the successor to Muhammad (Ali for the Shia, Abu 
Bakr for Sunni). Catholics and Shia follow powerful, ordained leaders (the Pope, priests; 
Ayatollahs and imams). Protestants and Sunni have more diverse and numerous centers 
of gravity, with individual clergy being less prominent in interpreting the religion. 
Shi’ites glorify martyrs and saints much like Catholics do. Southwick also makes the 
point that Christianity had its own era of religious violence, rivaling anything seen in the 
Muslim world 189—a point that is not widely acknowledged in American discourse. 
Another parallel lies in the power of these comparative sects: Since the Reformation, 
Protestants have generally held the power in the English-speaking world as opposed to 
Catholics, and Sunnis are the majority in most of the Arab countries.190 While current 
battles that are nominally waged due to this historical divergence and the assassination of 
Hussein can seem irrelevant in modern times, it may be helpful to note that the ancient 
sufferings of Jesus and Hussein are still annually commemorated by Catholics and Shia, 
both participating in bloody self-flagellation to honor those sacrifices. 
D. SALAFISM 
Salafism is a Sunni reformist movement that evolved in response to a perceived 
“stagnation and weakness in the Islamic world and advocated a return to the basics of 
Islam;”191 it is not violent in and of itself. It is based on the literal interpretation of the 
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Quran and the Sunnah192 and on following the practices of the “salaf,” or the Prophet’s 
companions because they “learned about Islam directly from the messenger of God.”193 
Major influences of Salafism include Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (780–855), the founder of the 
Hanbali school of law; Ahmad Ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328); and Muhammad Ibn Abd al-
Wahhab (1703–1792), the father of Wahhabism,194 although many consider the fathers of 
Salafism to be Egyptian theologians Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–1897) and his 
follower, Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905).195 Moussalli contests this, arguing that while 
reformers such as al-Afghani and Abduh employed the concept of salaf or practicing as 
Muhammad’s disciples did, “that does not make them salafists.”196 Each of these men 
advocated a strict interpretation of the Quran and Sunnah as the lone sources of theology 
and jurisprudence, as well as tawhid or “unity of God,” which is “the crux of the Salafi 
creed.”197 Tawhid is based on the beliefs that there is one God, God alone is the creator, 
God is “supreme and unique,” does not resemble anything known to man, and that only 
God should be worshipped.198 Salafis believe that they should live as those who knew 
and followed the Prophet did; those first three generations of Muslims are considered the 
practitioners of pure Islam. 
Salafis follow the Hanbali school of law, named for its founder Ahmad Ibn 
Hanbal, the most conservative and literalist of the four Sunni Orthodox schools of 
jurisprudence. Hanbali restricts sources of Islamic law to the Quran and the Sunnah, as its 
founder “favored a literalist interpretation of the Koran and Sunnah and rejected informed 
reasoning.” 199  It is the law of the land in Saudi Arabia, and it is characterized by 
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“extreme rigor and a literal interpretation of the holy texts.”200 Salafis eschew any logical 
or rational application or interpretation of the Quran and the Sunnah, in conflict with 
some Islamic scholars. According to Ayoob, theologians like Muhammad Abduh of 
Egypt around the turn of the twentieth century advocated looking back to “pristine Islam” 
before it was corrupted by ignorance to illustrate that it was, in fact, “in total accord with 
the scientific positivism and rationality that underpinned modernity.”201 Salafism has an 
“appeal to the poorer and more deprived segments of society,” and Salafis “take the view 
that Muslims—especially those in the West—should concern themselves with spiritual 
affairs.”202 
Salafis consider any type of worship aside from the worship of God to be 
sacrilege, or “shirk,” and try to keep to themselves so as not to be corrupted by infidels. 
Moussalli comments, “For the same reason, they also reject all entertaining distractions: 
music, theatre and places of pleasure and entertainment.”203 This explains the destruction 
of many historic places in Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq at the hands of VSJ adherents, as 
well as the prohibition of music and theater by the Taliban. 
Wiktorowicz developed a framework to explain the significant nuances among 
Salafis. He breaks Salafism down into three groups: the Purists, the Politicos, and the 
Jihadis.204 This is important to understand when developing strategies to combat violent 
Salafi jihadis. It is essential that, when invoking the name of a religious group in such a 
negative context, the qualifying language is necessary to ensure the precision of the term. 
Wiktorowicz clearly illustrates that, even within Salafism, there are important 
differences. Targeting the Purists, or even the Politicos, can undermine the U.S. 
government’s goal of defeating the jihadis, or VSJ adherents, by forcing an alliance of 
necessity among these three very different groups against the outsiders (Christians and 
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Jews) attacking “Salafism.” It forces them under the same tent when it is not necessarily 
in their nature to be allied.  
As in other fundamentalist interpretations of world religions, Salafis take the word 
in their holy books literally, in an attempt to follow in the exact footsteps of the founders, 
Muhammad and the Pious Predecessors. The fundamentalist nature of Salafism can be 
compared to similar beliefs in Christianity and Judaism, adhering to a literal 
interpretation of scripture and a “purer” version of what they consider corruption of the 
religion, as noted by Richard Antoun.205 He articulates, “In their attempt to purify the 
religion, Salafis try to emulate the supposedly true Islam of ‘the pious predecessors’ (al-
salaf alsalih), embodied by the Prophet Muhammad and the first generations of 
Muslims.”206 Similar to the Christian Evangelical bumper sticker popularized in the U.S. 
asking “What Would Jesus Do? (WWJD?)” in an effort to remind people of Jesus 
Christ’s life as reflected in the Christian Bible, Salafis view their spiritual lives through a 
similar lens with respect to Muhammad (what would Muhammad do?). According to 
Wiktorowicz:  
Salafi scholars must examine the life of the Prophet to extract model 
actions that transcend time and then apply these examples to the modern 
context. In essence, they ask what the Prophet would do if he were alive 
today. Given his life and example, how would he respond to contemporary 
issues and problems?207  
This is the guidance that frames how Salafis live their lives. 
To complicate things, Salafism is sometimes confused with Wahhabism, the 
puritanical school of thought named for its founder, Muhammad Bin Abd al-Wahhab. 
Wahhabism is predominantly associated with the Saudi export of Salafism, but it is 
different from Salafism in that it accepts the authority of the Saudi king. 208 
Consequently, the royal family has used its enormous wealth to build and support 
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Wahhabi religious schools, or madrassas, worldwide. Like VSJ, Wahhabism condemns 
all who do not believe as they do as “takfiri.”209 Moussalli specifies, “Under the takfiri 
doctrine, al-Wahhab and his followers could deem fellow Muslims infidels should they 
engage in activities that in any way could be said to encroach on the sovereignty of the 
absolute Authority (that is, the King).”210 The Wahhabi connection to Saudi Arabia’s 
ruling monarchy is rejected by some Salafis in that Wahhabists view the Saudi royal 
family as a corrupt sponsor of Islam. In contrast, the purist Salafis are more likely to fall 
into the Wahhabi groupings based on their disinterest in unseating Muslim authority 
figures, no matter how corrupt, believing that corruption is better than a power vacuum 
that could lead to anarchy. Moussalli makes this point, asserting:  
Historically, the Salafists, and again unlike the Islamists, have not only 
developed a moderate stance towards existing rulers, but even argued that 
Muslims must obey their rulers, whether just or unjust, on the condition 
that they do not command committing any sin… to criticize a legitimate 
ruler might bring about anarchism, an act that is an absolute deviation 
from the salafist manhaj (method).211  
This is where VSJ breaks with other Salafi beliefs; VSJ considers corrupt Muslim 
rulers, which would include anyone allied with the U.S. as fair game and seeks to not 
only depose, but to replace them. Daesh has taken this concept further than previous VSJ 
inspired groups in that it has conquered and taken over territory, governing it to some 
extent. 
Salafis believe only they are true Muslims. This is common among 
fundamentalists across religions who believe that they alone are chosen by God and 
exclude outsiders (the Other) who aim to contaminate their faith or tempt them to behave 
contrary to their beliefs. In his examination of fundamentalism in Christianity, Judaism, 
and Islam, Richard Antoun discusses how self-segregation is used to prevent corruption 
of these true believers who follow a strict and literal interpretation of scripture, forming a 
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common thread to fundamentalism in Islam (Salafis), Christianity (Evangelicals) and 
Judaism (Haredim).212  
As defined by Wiktorowicz, the “Purists” are the self-segregating 
fundamentalists; those who see themselves as maintaining and propagating the pure 
version of Islam as Muhammad practiced it. They rely on the contextual interpretation 
related to Muhammad’s time in Mecca, when he focused on religious education, or 
spreading the word of Islam. As Muhammad’s followers were a minority in Mecca, then 
populated by “pagan cults,” specifically his own tribe of Quraysh, Muhammad took a 
peaceful approach to spreading the word of God.213 Rebellion against those in power 
could have instigated violent repression, which would directly prevent him from his goal 
of preaching Islam.  
Purists view Judaism and Christianity as religions that are corrupt and pose an 
existential threat to Islam, and this is a part of the Islamic narrative that is very important 
for Westerners to understand. It is based in the core writings of Islam, and when taken 
literally, it supports an intrinsic suspicion of the motives of non-Muslims. Wiktorowicz 
explains this suspicion, partly derived from the Quran 3:118, which states, “The Jews and 
Christians will never be pleased with you until you change your religion.”214 He goes on 
to acknowledge “a conspiratorial view of non- Muslims as arch-enemies driven by a 
desire to pull Muslims away from their beliefs. This is important to understand when 
developing counterterrorism strategies, and attempting to impose western values on 
Muslim cultures.”215  
Purist Salafis who have settled in Europe try to isolate themselves from those they 
consider a threat to their complete dedication and literal following of the holy books. For 
obvious reasons, they are the subject of concern based on their insularity and literalist 
Salafist beliefs. They limit their interactions with the broader society, often developing 
enclave communities that function like Salafi ghettos. They reject association with non-
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Muslims in their countries of residence and instead view themselves as part of an 
international imagined community of true believers. Their identity is predicated on their 
creed and not their country.216 They exist in, but are not part of, the larger society, and 
much like the Amish in Pennsylvania, they reject the potential corruption of values and 
ideals. 
The “Politicos,” are the Islamists of Salafism, who see the way to an Islamic 
society as participation in the political system. Politicos are at odds with the Purist 
concept that Muslims must endure corrupt Muslim rulers and be satisfied to have an 
advisory role. 217  The most recent example of Salafi Islamists, or “Politicos” in 
Wiktorowicz’s framework, is the Salafist al Nour Party in Egypt. According to Khalil as-
Anani, the al Nour Party is in a power struggle with the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) that is 
rooted in 40 years of Egyptian history. He also observes,  
The current crisis between the Brotherhood and the Salafists reveals that 
power, and neither religion nor ideology, is the ultimate goal of Islamists, 
and their bid to grab it might usher in a new era of intra-Islamist conflict 
with unpredictable consequences.218  
This is a reflection of how complex the ground truth often is. In 2011, al Nour and 
the MB entered into a coalition that successfully passed proposed constitutional 
amendments; a few months later, divisions over advocating Sharia law during the protests 
of July 2011 ended the alliance.219 This is just one example among many that illustrates 
the complexity and nuance that U.S. national strategies do not address.  
Wiktorowicz’s third category, the “Jihadis,” are the subject of the next chapter. 
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V. UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT: VIOLENT SALAFI 
JIHADISM  
Any attempt to defeat the enemy that involves outwitting and deceiving 
him must be preceded by an endeavor to understand him.  
Martin Van Creveld, The Transformation of War 
A. AN OVERVIEW OF VSJ 
This thesis argues that a unified national strategy to combat VSJ would strengthen 
U.S. efforts to diminish or eliminate this threat. The main premise of this argument is that 
the vague and imprecise language currently in strategy documents is counterproductive 
and due, to an extent, to a lack of understanding of what VSJ is. This chapter provides an 
overview of VSJ, the history of its evolution, and how it has spread, as well as what 
adherents want and why they target the U.S. 
The jihadists are the most infamous of the three categories of Salafism 
Wiktorowicz describes but still not fully understood. VSJ promotes an extremely 
conservative form of Islam, promoting strict adherence to Sharia as the law of the land by 
coercion or by force. VSJ has adherents in many countries, and as noted by Jones in the 
RAND report cited earlier, was the ideology motivating at least 49 identified groups as of 
2013.220 Many such groups evolved in a very local context; some developed as a result of 
Saudi influence; and some have associated their local grievances with the “global” jihad 
in what Marret referred to as “glocal” movements.221  
VSJ does not fit into a Western type organizational chart, as was noted earlier by Raufer, 
but that is how the threat is portrayed in U.S. national strategies. Both the 2015 National 
Security Strategy (NSS) and the 2015 National Military Strategy (NMS) refer to the 
terrorist adversary as an organization, as opposed to an ideology or a movement. The 
NSS refers to the threat generically as terrorist organizations and networks, in the same 
220 Jones, A Persistent Threat, 27. 
221 Marret, “Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb.” 
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breath with transnational organized crime organizations and networks. This may be partly 
due to the fact that military and law enforcement have the lead for U.S. strategies, and 
military and criminal organizational structures are how, in general, they frame the 
adversary’s structure at a high level. In an effort to provide a better understanding of VSJ, 
how it fits in with the larger Islamic construct, and why it is important to refer to it 
specifically and accurately in a national strategy, a diagram may be helpful (see Figure 
1). VSJ exists under the broad umbrella of Sunni Islam, but it is relatively small segment 
of Salafists; this should make clear that more precise language is needed.  
Figure 1.  Where VSJ Fits in Islam 
 
 
With respect to using the term VSJ to replace “Islamic terrorist,” “violent 
extremist,” “radical Islamist,” and similar inaccurate terms, there is a danger that the 
references to “Salafi” as part of VSJ will reflect on peaceful, albeit “radical” or 
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“puritanical” practitioners of the religion, instead of focusing on the violent cult-like VSJ 
movement. Even though it is to some extent redundant, this thesis argues for the need to 
add “violent” to the accepted term “Salafi jihadi” to ensure there is no confusion about 
the nature of the ideology that poses a threat to the U.S. Due to the ambiguous nature of 
the language used in strategies and political discourse related to VSJ, Salafism “has 
incorrectly become synonymous with jihadi ideology. However, most Salafis—while 
extremely puritanical—reject suicide bombing and violence.” 222  It is important that 
policymakers understand that VSJs are a subset of Salafis, separated by their adherence 
to violence and takfir. The VSJ movement is what the U.S. worries about, evidenced by 
the numerous references in national strategy to the threat of AQ and its “affiliates and 
adherents”223 and, more recently, by FBI Director James Comey, who called Daesh a 
more serious threat to the U.S. than AQ.224  
B. HOW VSJ EVOLVED 
There are differing perspectives as to where VSJ came from and when, 
particularly as it is personified by AQ. VSJ can trace its literalist roots to the Wahhabism 
that was adopted by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the eighteenth century. As was 
mentioned in the previous chapter, Wahhabism emphasizes the notion of takfir, which 
has been used by the VSJ movement for decades to justify the murder of Muslims not 
aligned with its worldview. There has been speculation that the 1979 siege of the Grand 
Mosque in Mecca inspired bin Laden to lead what has become VSJ,225 but it is more 
likely that he became a hub for already existing movements that were evolving in Muslim 
countries as a result of the coalescence of jihadi ideology that emerged from Afghanistan 
in the 1980s. Kepel first noticed them as an “international brigade of jihad 
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veterans…outside of the control of any state…suddenly available to serve Islamist causes 
anywhere in the world...(and who) perceived the world in the light of religious doctrine 
and armed violence.”226 This was the first observance of VSJ as a movement. 
Takfir is a central tenet of VSJ. Takfir began as a fatwa, or formal legal opinion, 
issued by Sheik Ibn Taymiyya against the Mongols in the fourteenth century. The 
Mongols had driven Ibn Taymiyya’s family from their home, and he needed a way to 
justify fighting against other Muslims.227 While the Mongols had converted to Islam, 
they continued to follow the law of Geghis Kahn as opposed to Sharia, and therefore Ibn 
Taymiyyah was able to pronounce takfir on them. 228  Takfir labels subjects as 
unbelievers, or kafirs, and permits the expulsion Muslims who have turned away from 
Islam. VSJ adherents similarly interpret takfir as justification for the murder of Muslims 
who practice Islam differently from them. Firro confirms that takfir has been interpreted 
differently by various scholars and has been used in power struggles internal to Muslim 
countries.229 Kepel cites the examples in the 1990s of Wahhabi clerics and the Algerian 
Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) pronouncing political adversaries as kafir in their own 
political interests.230  
VSJ adherents have perpetrated most of the terrorist attacks against the U.S. and 
the West over the past 20 years. In Moghadam’s analysis of suicide bombings and who 
was predominantly responsible for them from 1981 to 2007, the data points to VSJ 
groups as dominant since the late 1990s. After the U.S. invasion in 2003, Iraq became 
their focal point: “Of the 1,020 suicide attacks in Iraq recorded in the data set, 208 were 
claimed by Salafi jihadist groups…anecdotal accounts suggest that the overwhelming 
number of all suicide attacks in Iraq are conducted by Salafi jihadist groups.”231  
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According to Moghadam: 
Al-Qaeda and its Salafi jihadist ideology have produced an altogether new 
pattern of suicide attacks, namely, ‘globalized suicide missions,’ which 
can be distinguished from ‘localized’ suicide missions, the more 
traditional pattern of suicide attacks. Localized and globalized patterns of 
suicide missions differ in five key areas: the types of conflicts in which 
these attacks are used; group ideology; the geographic scope of these 
actors; their target definition; and their goals.232  
Figure 2 shows the prevalence of Salafi Jihadi suicide attacks compared to other groups 
that use that tactic. 
Figure 2.  Number of Attacks by Ideology December 1981–March 2008 
 
Source: Moghadam, “Motives for Martyrdom,” 70.  
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C. WAHHABISM AND VSJ 
Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabism can be considered the foundation for VSJ, although 
the establishment of that movement, now an enemy of the Saudi government, was 
unintentional. The origin of the alliance between Wahhabism and Saudi Arabia dates 
back to the eighteenth century, when Wahhab joined with a local tribal chief, Muhammad 
ibn Saud, to “legitimate his jihad to subdue and unite the tribes of Arabia, converting 
them to this puritanical version of Islam.”233 After losing power to Egypt in the early 
nineteenth century, Abdulaziz Ibn Saud restored the kingdom in the early twentieth 
century, along with Wahhabism.  
During the last century and continuing to the present day, Wahhabis and the Saudi 
royal family established a mutually beneficial relationship, each compromising for what 
they saw as the greater good. With support from the Council of Senior Scholars, or 
ulema, the Saudi royal family has maintained its hold on power, despite displaying un-
Islamic behavior over the years. The Saudi ulema has turned a blind eye to the 
Westernized behavior of the royal family in return for dominating Saudi societal norms in 
the kingdom (such as the prohibition on women driving) and taking advantage of vast 
government and charitable resources to spread their ultraconservative version of Islam 
around the world. As early as the 1960s, the House of Saud was spreading Wahhabism 
internationally by using the profits from oil sales to establish Wahhabi schools and build 
mosques in other countries run by Wahhabi clerics. According to Kepel, this effort was 
intended to counter the influence of Nasser’s Egypt, and spread a very conservative, 
literal, and loyal (to Saudi Arabia) version of Salafism across the region. 234 This is 
significant to understanding the power structure and educational apparatus that supports 
VSJ. 
VSJ incorporates much of the Saudi supported Wahhabi doctrine into the 
overarching ideology, but it does not accept the Saudi royal family, targeting it with 
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violence along with others deemed “apostates.”235 However, Saudi funding continues to 
support extremist Wahhabi mosques around the world, fueling the VSJ movement. 
According to Kepel, Saudis used the considerable profits from the sale of oil to “reach 
out and spread Wahhabism across the Muslim world ... to ‘Wahhabize’ Islam 
worldwide.”236 According to a former MI6 agent, the Saudis’ intent was to reduce the 
“multitude of voices within the religion to a ‘single creed’—a movement which would 
transcend national divisions. Billions of dollars were—and continue to be—invested in 
this manifestation of soft power.”237 This continues to be a problem for many countries, 
particularly those like Tunisia that are struggling to establish a democracy in the wake of 
the “Arab Spring” of 2012, and should be acknowledged in a U.S. national strategy. 
There have been multiple geopolitical influences that contributed to growth and 
spread of VSJ in countries across the African, European, and Asian landscapes. A perfect 
storm occurred following the Soviet invasion in 1979; Islamic fighters of all types came 
to the defense of a Muslim nation attacked by a non-Muslim power. Afghan Pashtuns, the 
largest community in Afghanistan, 238  were Deobandi Muslims, a movement that 
originated in nineteenth century India “to train a corps of ulemas capable of issuing 
fatwas on all aspects of daily life…similar to the Wahhabis in Saudi Arabia.”239 Saudi 
Arabia took advantage of the opportunity to influence a broad population of Muslims 
joining that fight and infused the Deobandi seminaries with funding in exchange for 
exerting Wahhabi influence over the teachings.240 The influence of these Saudi-funded 
Wahhabi teachers set the stage for the extreme VSJ that manifested after the war as the 
Taliban.241  
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After the Soviets were expelled from Afghanistan and as foreign fighters 
dispersed to other battlefields or returned to their home countries, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein 
invaded his wealthy neighbor to the south, Kuwait, rattling Saudi Arabia, Kuwait’s 
neighbor to the west. The Saudi government called on the U.S. and other Westerners to 
help repel the Iraqi army, which inflamed fundamentalist Muslims far beyond Saudi 
borders.242 It was at this point, Kepel writes that what we refer to as modern “jihadist-
salafism” was spawned from its Wahhabist parentage into a new “hybrid Islamist 
ideology whose first doctrinal principle was to rationalise the existence and behaviour of 
militants.”243  
Disillusioned Wahhabists like Osama bin Laden, who had fought the Soviets in 
Afghanistan, decried the Saudi regime for allowing “infidels” on Holy Land. The new 
breed of Salafi jihadi rejected the Saudi authority over them, referring to them as 
“sheikists.” Kepel notes that the newly branded movement condemned the sheikists for 
“submitting to the non-Muslim United States, and their public and private vices.”244  
D. THE SPREAD OF VSJ 
Osama bin Laden, who was present in Afghanistan during the war and provided 
financial support to the mujahedeen, became a de facto leading figure representing the 
global VSJ movement, sending an open letter to the Saudi King in 1997 decrying the 
apostasy of the regime.245 He specifically called attention to the fact that U.S. military 
personnel should not be allowed in Saudi Arabia, or “the Land of the Two Holy Places” 
(in reference to Mecca and Medina), and further asserted that Americans should leave all 
Muslim countries. The staging of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia to contain Saddam 
Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was a humiliation for bin Laden and other 
Muslims, and seen as supremely disrespectful. Bin Laden accused the House of Saud of 
                                                 
242 For a more detailed account of the political complexities of this time and how it relates to the 
emergence of VSJ, see Chapter 9, “From the Gulf War to the Taliban Jihad,” of Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of 
Political Islam.  
243 Kepel, and Roberts, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, 219. 
244 Ibid., 220. 
245 Osama bin Laden, “Full Text: bin Laden’s ‘Letter to America,’” The Guardian, November 24, 
2002, sec. World News.  
 77 
being under the control of the Americans, who were in turn in league with Israel against 
Muslims.  
This has been a continuing theme in the VSJ narrative: the U.S. is seen as 
supporting the royal family in Saudi Arabia based on the need for oil and as an ally in the 
Persian Gulf region against Iran, and Saudi Arabia depends on the U.S. for military 
support and as a stable market for its oil. This mutually beneficial relationship figures 
prominently in the evolving VSJ narrative and influenced the change from targeting the 
“near enemy” (local corrupt and “un-Islamic regimes”) to the “far enemy” (the U.S. and 
Israel) by bin Laden and his followers.246 Bin Laden also included in his list of U.S. 
crimes the U.S. government’s sanctions against Iraq (and responsibility for the deaths of 
children denied medicine by those sanctions) and its support for oppressive regimes in 
Muslim countries. Bin Laden’s letter identified the issues that became common themes 
accompanying the evolution of VSJ under the mantle of “al Qa’ida,”247 and in fact, 
became the basis on which AQ was founded.248 
After the mujahedeen forces repelled the Soviet Army (with significant foreign 
assistance), U.S. interest, and therefore influence, in Afghanistan waned. Without 
sufficient resources on the ground, the U.S. did not foresee the potential impact of the rise 
of the Taliban.249 Many countries were involved in backing certain players in support of 
their own interests in Afghanistan during the 1990s, most significantly Pakistan and 
Saudi Arabia. The relatively minor involvement the U.S. did have was in support of the 
Northern Alliance, led by the so-called Lion of Panshir, Ahmed Shah Massoud. 250 
Massoud fought against the Taliban in the 1990s and was eventually murdered by VSJ 
adherents in 2001. During this time, the Taliban provided safe haven for bin Laden. 
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U.S. support of the Afghan “mujahedeen” in the war against the Soviets 
contributed to unintended consequences, one of which was the rise of the Taliban. The 
war against the Soviets also produced a generation of soldiers across the region who saw 
themselves as defenders of Islam.251 Volunteer fighters were recruited across the region 
to fight in Bosnia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Kashmir.252 The origins of AQ as the first 
significant manifestation of VSJ, what Marret referred to as a “glocal” movement, can be 
traced to these “mujahedeen” who responded to an international call to arms in defense of 
Muslims against non-Muslim aggressors.  
The Saudi strategy of spreading a puritanical version of Islam was executed not 
only by Wahhabi clerics in Saudi funded mosques but also by these veterans of the 
Afghan war. One example of this was in Chechnya, which experienced a transition 
toward VSJ with the arrival of Samer ben Saleh ben Abdallah al-Sweleim, a Saudi 
veteran of the Afghan War also known as Emir Khattab. Khattab arrived in Chechnya in 
1995 to serve as an advisor to the Chechen rebellion against the Russian Army, along 
with many other veterans who saw this as another theater to promote VSJ. As Chechnya 
was facing Russia without any additional foreign support, the foreign fighters were very 
welcome, and they had tremendous influence on the locals. As Williams discusses:  
Chechens in the Islamic cemaats (platoons) began to wear Wahhabi-style 
beards, to outlaw alcohol, and to construct the Russian opponents they had 
once shared a Communist homeland with as kafirs (infidels)…The arrival 
of Khattab’s Arab holy fighters began to successfully graft the concept of 
jihad onto the secular, Sovietized Chechens’ independence struggle.253  
Another example of the VSJ fighters spreading their ideology on a foreign 
battlefield took place in former Yugoslavia after that country disintegrated into a 
sectarian war. Bosnian Muslims, or Bosniaks, were under siege by Serbs, the worst single 
act of violence being the massacre of 7000 Muslim boys and men at Srebrenica. The 
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violent Salafi jihadi veterans of Afghanistan rallied to defend the Bosniaks, arriving in 
the summer of 1992. Within a year, they had formed one brigade; by the war’s end in 
1995, they had 10 brigades and between four and six thousand fighters. 254 The war 
provided combat training opportunities for the Afghan veterans and newcomers alike; 
however, even the Bosniaks, who also welcomed the VSJ foreign fighters who came to 
defend them, understood that their underlying motivation was to spread the ideology. A 
Bosniak told Trofimov after the war, “The primary goal of all the Arabs here was first to 
teach us religion, then help with the war.”255 
In fact, many VSJ adherents who figured prominently in attacks against the US, 
participated in the Balkan War, including Osama bin Laden, who was provided a 
“Bosnian passport in September 1999 and subsequently had at least one personal 
audience with President Izetbegovic.”256 In addition to bin Laden:  
(V)eterans of the Bosnian jihad in the 1990s included people such as 
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, mastermind of the 9/11 attacks; Abd al-Rahim 
al-Nashiri, involved in the attack on the USS Cole; Mamdouh Mahmud 
Salim, involved in the August 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in East 
Africa; Abu Hamza al-Masri, the spiritual father of the July 2005 London 
Underground bombings; and Zaki ur-Rehman Lakhvi, one of the 
participants in the November 2008 Mumbai bombings.257  
Trofimov observes that U.S. actions during the war in the Balkans were 
interpreted by many Bosniaks and Muslims in the region as anti-Islam, feeding into the 
VSJ narrative, in his book “Faith at War.”258 In addition to the massacres at Srebrenica, 
he asserts that the post 9/11 extradition of six Algerian fighters from Bosnia-Herzegovina 
by the U.S. to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba confirmed for some that the U.S. was fighting a 
war against Muslims. Additionally, the U.S. and allies prevented the Bosniaks from 
arming sufficiently to protect themselves, while the Serbs had the weaponry of the former 
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Yugoslav military to use against the Bosniaks. As a result, the nature of the Muslim 
community, once more European in nature, has morphed into something far more radical. 
As Esad Hecimovic, a leading expert on the Bosnian jihadi movement, has noted:  
There is now a new generation of Islamic preachers in Bosnia who were 
educated after the war at Islamic universities in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, 
Syria, and other countries. . . . Thus, it is no longer possible to distinguish 
between ‘imported’ and ‘local’ versions of Islam in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina anymore.259  
With the spread of VSJ by the veterans of the Afghan war, the movement was no longer 
tied to a specific geography nor to a government sponsor but spread across the Muslim 
world to fight on behalf of Sunni Muslims in a number of countries. 260  This was 
evidenced during the first half of the Iraq War, when Sunnis needed support against the 
newly empowered Shia; while it does not mean that these Sunnis became true believers in 
VSJ, it did provide an advantage for recruiters to the movement. It is important to note 
that the VSJ adherents’ proselytizing and efforts to convert and recruit Muslims to their 
intolerant, literal, and violent interpretation of Salafism has not always met with success. 
At times, VSJ adherents have been expelled from Muslim communities, as happened in 
Iraq261 during the so-called “Sunni Awakening” and in Kosovo in the battle between 
Albanian Muslims and Orthodox Christians in 1999.262 
E. VSJ AND THE UNITED STATES 
The question of “why they hate us,” posited in many opinion pieces and 
speculation in the U.S. after the September 11 attacks, did not focus on who “they” were. 
There are clear indicators that some U.S. policy actions have had unintended 
consequences regarding the expansion of VSJ; acknowledgement of this means that U.S. 
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strategies can also impact the environment positively. That is where the national strategy 
needs to come in to the discussion. 
The theme of VSJ as a reform movement, the main goal of which is gaining 
primacy in the Muslim world, was explored by Martin and Smith.263 They argue that, in 
fact, VSJ is first and foremost at war with Muslims who do not believe as they do. Martin 
and Smith posit, “what is often regarded as a global jihad against the West is, arguably, 
an incorrect, or at least a more nuanced, position.”264 The destruction of United States, 
specifically, and the West in general, they say, is peripheral to that internal struggle and 
used more as a means to an end than a true objective. In talking about the focus of AQ’s 
propaganda on demonization of the West, they note that it “usefully deflects attention 
away from its core objective of asserting its dominance within Sunni Islam, or more 
specifically Al Qaeda’s interpretation of Islam.”265 
There have been many portrayals of what the VSJ movement hopes to achieve in 
U.S. political discourse, which as a matter of foundation needs to be clear in order to 
strategize effectively against it. In the struggle to understand the threat, the first National 
Strategy for Combating Terrorism focused on the 9/11 attacks themselves, framing them 
as “acts of war against the United States of America and its allies, and against the very 
idea of civilized society.” 266  However, Martin and Smith argue that a more 
comprehensive study of VSJ indicates that the primary goal of the movement is “first and 
foremost to secure the dominance of the Salafist interpretation of Islam.”267 They go on 
to explain that, the “fixation on the threat Al Qaeda’s ‘global jihad’ poses to the West, 
directly or indirectly, has led to a partial assessment of its aims and motives.”268 U.S. 
strategies have not sufficiently capitalized on the fact that VSJ primarily targets other 
Muslims and is focused on what it considers “Muslim lands,” as opposed to the actual 
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globe. The messaging that their fight is with the U.S., or the “West,” while accurate to the 
extent it feeds into their primary goal, is a convenient distraction from their ultimate 
objective. Osama bin Laden’s “Letter to America,” published in 2002, illustrates this by 
focusing on the U.S. and emphasizing the West versus Islam narrative, portraying AQ as 
playing offensive defense based on U.S. actions in Muslim lands.269 
The U.S. continues to act tactically against VSJ in the Middle East and beyond, 
not necessarily seeking to impact the broader movement. The U.S. military has conducted 
counterterrorism operations across northern Africa, the Middle East, and Asia in dozens 
of countries over the past decade. These actions are in general tactically oriented, 
pursuing individuals or organizations, and not looking at VSJ as a single underlying 
issue. U.S. involvement across the region, including in the civil war in Syria, with the 
unstable Shia government in Iraq, against AQ in northwest Pakistan and southeastern 
Afghanistan along with the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Shabaab in Somalia, and as well 
as VSJ inspired groups in Libya can contribute to the popularity of these groups at the 
local level. An overarching strategy to deal with VSJ across the board in a manner that 
focuses on it first and foremost has the potential to unify national vision and to be less 
reactive to events independent of that larger goal. These tactical operations have kept the 
U.S. military in the crosshairs of VSJ inspired groups, and have influenced sympathetic 
individuals in the U.S. as well. In referencing VSJ inspired plots against military targets 
in the U.S., Lieutenant Colonel Sawyer of the Countering Terrorism Center at West Point 
concludes,  
To an Al Qaeda adherent, the U.S. military represents the manifestation of 
American foreign policy more so than any other target choice as the 
military—in Al Qaeda’s narrative—is responsible for the oppression and 
humiliation of Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Yemen, among other 
locations.270 
The U.S. relationship with Saudi Arabia, as noted in bin Laden’s letter to the king, 
has kept it squarely on the “enemies list” of VSJ adherents. The dynamics of how that 
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country rules its subjects are very complicated, as is its relationship with the U.S. 
Significant geopolitical issues (e.g., Iran) as well as commercial issues (e.g., oil, sale of 
military equipment, and promise of defense support) understandably drive much of U.S. 
strategy in the region. The fact that money from Saudi Arabia is funding the spread of 
VSJ around the world is an issue that should be addressed in a unified strategy.  
The U.S. government’s relationship with Israel and the perceived support for its 
treatment of the Palestinians has been a fact acknowledged not only by U.S. 
policymakers, but also by VSJ adherents as a reason the U.S. has been attacked. In the 
painstakingly referenced book, The Israel Lobby, Mearsheimer and Walt make the case 
that prior to the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, support for Israel was the major motivation 
for terror attacks on the U.S. They cite work done by the 9/11 Commission as well as 
Steven Coll (Ghost Wars) in noting that both Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheik 
Mohammed (respectively, the 1993 World Trade Center bomber and the mastermind of 
the 9/11 attacks) were motivated by U.S. foreign policy in support of Israel.271  
VSJ represents a fringe element of Salafism, which is a fundamentalist movement 
within Sunni Islam. Reference to VSJ terrorism is fraught with poorly defined terms; the 
vague and unqualified terms “violent extremist” and “religious extremists” tend to be 
code words that implicate Islam as the culprit, as do “Islamic extremist” or “Islamist 
radicals,”—all of which miss the mark. Additionally, continuing to define the threat from 
VSJ as simply AQ or Daesh is also imprecise. As mentioned earlier, organizations come 
and go, and the names change (and change back) based on political realities.  
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VI. CONCLUSION: STRATEGY—WHAT THE U.S. HAS, WHAT 
THE U.S. NEEDS 
A good strategy is a coherent plan to tackle a defined problem…it 
identifies a challenge and sets out a plan for dealing with it. 
Richard Rumelt, Good and Bad Strategy 
 
National strategies produced by federal agencies are usually characterized by the 
fact that they set a course for the executive branch to reflect the administration’s goals for 
that agency. These strategies are reviewed and coordinated prior to publication across 
their respective Department, and then are staffed by the White House for approval. This 
process ensures that agency strategies do not contradict neither the vision of the sitting 
administration, nor other agency strategies. The nature of developing broad consensus on 
strategies (there are comments provided upon review, which are then adjudicated by the 
author(s)) is that they end up relatively bland; it is rare that a bold concept or exciting 
initiative is unveiled in a national strategy.  
Some strategies, such as the 2011 National Strategy for Counterterrorism, are 
problem focused, which is the approach that Rumelt advocated. However, this thesis 
argues that the problem needs to be defined with more precise language than 
“counterterrorism,” or “AQ and its affiliates and adherents,” to address the VSJ threat. 
This clear definition of the problem at the national level could pave the way for more 
creative, innovative, and directive plans to address that problem. The current frame for 
national strategies that address “counterterrorism” in whole or in part, define an enemy to 
be fought. The reference to that enemy being “al Qa’ida, its affiliates and adherents” is 
insufficient, as it makes the group central to the movement, as opposed to the movement 
being central to that particular (and other) group. Also, focusing on a group does not 
address the underlying motivation or ideology behind the threat, which is specific: the 
threat is not from Islam, or Islamists, of even Salafis; it is from violent Salafi jihadism.  
There is an abundance of literature on strategy but very little that is prescriptive, 
guaranteed to achieve success. In discussing the numerous definitions for “strategy,” 
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Mintzberg talks about strategy as a concept, the key significance of which is that it 
provides and guides a shared perspective. He argues:  
A major issue in the study of strategy formation becomes, therefore, how 
to read that collective mind—to understand how intentions diffuse through 
the system called organization to become shared and how actions come to 
be exercised on a collective yet consistent basis.272  
The argument for a unified strategy focusing on VSJ would fill the gap that currently 
exists with regard to that “collective mind” on the issue. In addition, it would focus 
efforts with the added benefit of a common understanding of the problem in support of a 
vision to address it. 
Currently, there is no precision of language in U.S. national strategies, most of 
which address terrorism as a tactic.273 As Jeffrey Record noted early on referencing the 
GWOT, “Sound strategy mandates threat discrimination and reasonable harmonization of 
ends and means…[the GWOT] is directed at the phenomenon of terrorism…[and] sets 
itself up for strategic failure.”274 The phrase commonly used in some of these strategies, 
“al Qa’ida and its affiliates and adherents,” gets closer to honing in on the problem than 
does the other oft-used generic term, “violent extremists.” However, a unified strategy 
would benefit from taking one more step and defining the problem as the movement 
itself: violent Salafi jihadism. Proposed clarifying language tends to revolve around 
replacing the generic “violent extremists” with some reference to Islam (understandably 
rejected by the Secretary of Homeland Security as implicating the entire religion)275 in 
U.S. political discourse, which reflects the lack of understanding that (as discussed in the 
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previous chapters). While the general reference to Islam is not useful and, based on this 
research, is actually counterproductive to U.S. strategic interests, it does clearly illustrate 
the need to establish more precise language. Violent Salafi jihadism fits that bill; it very 
specifically speaks to a small fringe group (not Islam, not Sunni, not even Salafi), the 
ideology of which explicitly promotes violence to achieve its goals. 
According to Rumelt, “A good strategy does more than urge us forward toward a 
goal or vision; it honestly acknowledges the challenges we face and provides an approach 
to overcoming them.”276 This brings to mind some of the challenges discussed in this 
thesis that are politically difficult to address but are essential elements in any national 
strategy for combatting the VSJ movement. These challenges include U.S. foreign policy 
towards Saudi Arabia and Israel. Another is the Saudi (government and charities) export 
of Wahhabi Islam around the world, especially to less stable countries, like those 
identified as “high threat” by Seth Jones (see Figure 3). A 2003 Congressional Research 
Service report noted:  
Saudi funding of mosques, madrasas, and charities, some of which have 
been linked to terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, has raised concern that 
Wahhabi Islam has been used by militants who tailor this ideology to suit 
their political goals and who rely on Saudi donations to support their 
aspirations.277  
As a result, both the U.S. House and Senate submitted concurrent resolutions:278  
(C)alling on the Government of Saudi Arabia to cease supporting religious 
ideologies that promote hatred, intolerance, violence, and other abuses of 
internationally recognized human rights and urging the Government of the 
United States to promote religious freedom in Saudi Arabia.279  
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Both of these resolutions were referred to committee; additional actions on these 
resolutions were not available.  
Figure 3.  Countries of Concern for the United States 
 
Source: Jones, A Persistent Threat, 50. 
Among other things, a national vision to combat VSJ should address the 
management of fear that has gripped the U.S., and the tendency to conflate the threat 
posed by global VSJ linked to AQ and Daesh with political Islamist groups such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood, HAMAS, and Hezbollah and with nation states like Iran, all of 
which have used terrorist tactics in furtherance of their political goals. This conflation of 
the threat in lieu of a targeted national strategy addressing VSJ inhibits the ability to 
focus resources where they are needed and prevents the U.S. from gaining the strategic 
advantage that could be gained by disaggregating these groups. While each poses unique 
security challenges and use of terrorist tactics are abhorrent, they represent a different 
type of threat than does VSJ. 
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In the RAND report A Persistent Threat,280 there is a long list of VSJ groups that 
the U.S. can target. Based on groups that have come and gone, and those yet to be 
identified or created, a unified national strategy would benefit from emphasizing the 
movement itself and prioritizing groups, as they ebb and flow, that maintain an intent and 
capability to attack the U.S. While some groups may be long lived, others may be “flash 
in the pan” or change their name in an effort to affiliate their cause with a more 
prominent group to suit their own needs. Naming specific groups in a U.S. national 
strategy provides cache to those groups, elevating the global profile of such groups in that 
they merit the attention of the most powerful nation on earth. It also misses the mark in 
identifying that the adversary is broader than any one or two groups; the U.S. should be 
clear that it will target VSJ wherever that movement threatens national or homeland 
security. In order to truly focus on the adversary, the U.S. should identify the movement 
that underlies these groups, no matter what country they are from or what they name their 
group from one day to the next: VSJ. This is the adversary—not “Islamic radicals,” not 
“Islamists,” not “violent extremists,” but violent Salafi jihadists. 
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